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AT THE INTERSECTION OF BANKRUPTCY AND DIVORCE: 
PROPER1Y DIVISION llEBTS UNDER THE 
BANKRUPTCY REFORM ACT OF 1994 
Meredith Johnson 
Bankruptcy has long had unique implications for divorce settlements 
and debts between ex-spouses. Historically, some marital debts owed from one 
ex-spouse to another were excepted from the traditional policy of "discharge. " 
Bankruptcy law distinguished between debts in the nature of alimony, main-
tenance, and support, which were protected from discharge, and property di-
vision debts, which were not. This distinction often had harsh consequences 
for creditor ex-spouses. Reeently, Congress enacted the Bankruptcy Reform 
Act of 1994, in part to ameliorate this problem. The amended Bankruptcy 
Code providP..s better protection for some property division debts. In this Note, 
Ms. Johnson argues that the new amendments, while certainly a conscien-
tious enhancement of the Bankruptcy Code's previously inadequate protec-
tion for marital debts, are in need of clarification. She locates several 
problems in these new amendments, and recommends specific guidelines to 
the National Bankruptcy Review Commission. 
Ms. Johnson canvasses legal commentary on the new legislation and 
suroeys contemporary case law to demonstrate that myriad difficulties exist 
in the application of the new section 523(a)(15)(B) "balancing test" created 
lly the Reform Act. She argues that the test encourages excessive flexibility 
and subjectivity. The "balancing" function is performed with varying de-
grees of success, and some courts have tended to uphold discharge notwith-
standing the possibility of bankruptcy for the creditor ex-spouse. Al5o, nUr 
merous splits of authority have emerged. Ms. Johnson recommends specific 
guidelines to clari.fj section 523(a)(15)(B). These standards would remedy 
current problems of opacity, lack of uniformity, and subjectivity. Implemen-
tation of these guidelines would give bankruptcy judges better direction in 
applying the balancing test, while more effectively realizing Congress's goal: 
greater protection for marital debts. 
Imagine that you are working late one night on a complicated di-
vorce case. The phone rings, and on the other end of the line you 
hear your client's voice, strained almost to the point of tears. 
''What's the matter?" you ask. "I got this notice that my ex-husband 
filed for bankruptcy," the client says, "I called him and he laughed 
at me and said, 'beating me into the ground fina.11cially won't work. 
I'm filing bankruptcy so that I don't have to pay child support or 
those debts listed in the divorce decree.' " 1 
A practitioner with incomplete knowledge of the Bankruptcy Reform 
Act of 19942 might find litde cause for alarm. In contrast to provisions in 
1. Dale Ellis, Divorce Cases After the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1994 (With Forms), 
Prac. Law.,July 1995, at 79, 79-80. 
2. Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-394, 108 Stat. 4106 (codified as 
amended in scattered sections of 11 U.S. C.) [hereinafter Reform Act]. 
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the 1978 Bankruptcy Code,3 which often had harsh consequences for the 
ex-spouses and children of bankruptcy filers,4 supporters have touted the 
Reform Act as reflecting "the public interest in providing support for a 
child, spouse or former spouse. "5 Whereas the 1978 Bankruptcy Code 
protected family support obligations from discharge6 only if they were in 
the nature of alimony, maintenance, or support, 7 the Reform Act pro-
tects some property division debts8 through application of the new sec-
tion 523(a) (15) of the Bankruptcy Code.9 
The practitioner who further investigates bankruptcy case law and 
the scholarly literature since the passage of the Reform Act may find 
greater cause for concern in her client's late night call. Though the 
Reform Act protects some property division debts from discharge, cases 
and commentary reveal that current law regarding the discharge of these 
debts is in a state of confusion, and offers few useful standards to guide 
the bankruptcy bench in interpreting the new statute. It is thus too soon 
to conclude with confidence that previous problems with the Bankruptcy 
Code have been eliminated, and that spouses, ex-spouses, and children of 
debtors are now adequately protected from the potential burdens of 
property division debts. 
While acknowledging the progressive nature of the Reform Act, this 
Note suggests that considerable difficulties remain. The Note locates sev-
eral problems in the new amendments and recommends to the newly-
created National Bankruptcy Review Commission10 specific, universal 
3. Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-598, 92 Stat. 2549 (codified as 
amended at 11 U.S.C. §§ 101-1330 (1994)) [hereinafter Bankruptcy Code]. 
4. See Ellis, supra note 1, at 80; infra Part I.A. 
5. Meg Lawless, The Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1994 and Its Effect on Family Law, 
The Advocate, July 1995, at 9, 9. 
6. In bankruptcy, a discharge amounts to 
[t)he release of a debtor from all of his debts which are provable in bankruptcy, 
except such as are excepted by the Bankruptcy Code. The discharge of the 
debtor is the step which regularly follows the filing of a petition in bankruptcy 
and the administration of his estate. By it the debtor is released from the 
obligation of all his debts which were or might be proved in the proceedings, so 
that they are no longer a charge upon him, and so that he may thereafter engage 
in business and acquire property without its being liable for the satisfaction of 
other such former debts. 
Black's Law Dictionary 463 (6th eel. 1990); see also 11 U.S.C. § 524 (1994) (describing 
effects of discharge). 
7. See Candace C. Carlyon, Daddy Don't You Walk So Fast: Bankruptcy Court No 
Longer Safe Haven for Support Debtors, Nev. Law., Oct. 1995, at 16, 17. 
8. "An obligation that is not a support debt is, by process of elimination, a property 
division debt." Margaret Dee McGarity, Family Law Provisions in the Bankruptcy Reform 
Act of 1994, 27 Bankr. Ct. Dec. (LRP) (May 16, 1995), available in Westlaw, TP-ALL 
Database. For example, mortgages and credit card debts are property division debts. See, 
e.g., Hill v. Hill (In re Hill), 184 B.R 750 (Bankr. N.D. lll. 1995) (analyzing mortgages and 
credit card debts as property division debts). 
9. See 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(15) (1994). 
10. As part of the Reform Act, Congress created the National Bankruptcy Review 
Commission to investigate and study issues relating to the amendments. See 11 U.S. C. ch. 
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guidelines for implementing section 523(a) (15) (B) of the Bankruptcy 
Reform Act of 1994. Coherent and uniform rules of application are nec-
essary to effect the congressional goal of providing "greater protection 
for alimony, maintenance, and support obligations owing to a spouse, 
former spouse or child of a debtor in bankruptcy. "11 If Congress were to 
adopt these recommendations and clarify the new legislation, the prac-
tice of both bankruptcy judges and lawyers would be simplified and con-
gressional intent would be maximized. The ultimate goal of this Note is 
therefore to urge clarification of the new amendment, and to recom-
mend interpretations of the statute that will more effectively realize 
Congress's goal: greater protection for marital debts in appropriate 
cases. 
Part I will explore the context in which the Reform Act was passed. 
It will explain the state of the law regarding discharge of marital obliga-
tions prior to the Reform Act, subsequent developments providing the 
impetus for change in this area, and the text of the Reform Act, along 
with its legislative history. Part I will also examine the larger social and 
legal contexts in which current bankruptcy jurisprudence is situated. 
Part II will map out the present state of the law in this area. First, Part II 
will explain how discharge proceedings under the new amendments op-
erate. Then, by analyzing professional commentary, a sample of recently 
decided cases, and by offering a critique of current implementation, Part 
II will demonstrate the need for guidelines for implementing the new 
statutory provision. Finally, Part III will propose a set of guidelines to 
clarify the legislation and assist judges in the application of the new 
section. 
I. HISTORICAL, LEGAL, AND SociAL CoNTExT oF THE BANKRUPTCY 
REFoRM Acr oF 1994 
A primary purpose of bankruptcy law historically has been to provide 
the "honest but unfortunate debtor ... a new opportunity in life and a 
clear field for future effort, unhampered by the pressure and discourage-
ment of preexisting debt"-a fresh start.12 Additionally, although United 
States bankruptcy laws "reflect a variety of separate and discreet policies," 
one clear purpose is to "provide a collective forum for sorting out the 
rights of the various claimants against the assets of a debtor where there 
are not enough assets to go around. "13 Although bankruptcy has existed 
since biblical times, the practice as it is known today became a permanent 
component of United States law in 1898, after several unsuccessful at-
1 note (1994) (National Bankruptcy Review Commission). For more information on the 
Commission and its function, see infra notes 209-215 and accompanying text. 
11. H.R. Rep. No. 103-835, at54.(1994), reprinted in 1994 U.S.C.C.AN. 3340,3363. 
12. Local Loan Co. v. Hunt, 292 U.S. 234, 244 (1934). 
13. 1 David G. Epstein et aL, Bankruptcy § 1-2 (1992). 
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tempts at establishing a uniform system of bankruptcy.14 The original 
statute did not undergo modernization until eighty years later with the 
enactment of the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978.15 
Generally, there are two types of bankruptcy: liquidation (Chapter 
7) and rehabilitation (Chapters 11, 12, and 13).16 Usually, eighty or 
ninety percent of debtors are non-business debtors, and between seventy 
and eighty percent of bankruptcy filings are under Chapter 7,17 When a 
debtor declares bankruptcy under Chapter 7, a trustee collects the 
debtor's nonexempt property, converts it to cash, and then distributes it 
among the creditors.18 Chapter 7 treats similarly situated creditors alike 
by providing for pro rata distribution to holders of unsecured claims.19 
The debtor forfeits his20 nonexempt property and hopes that his debts 
will be discharged:21 "a release of the debtor from any further personal 
liability for his or her pre-bankruptcy debts."22 Under Chapter 11, 12, 
and 13 rehabilitation cases, creditors expect to recover future earnings of 
the debtor rather than property owned at the time ofbankruptcy.23 The 
debtor usually keeps his assets and pays creditors as provided by a court-
approved plan.24 Discharge is available under these chapters as wel1.25 
14. See Gloria Jean Liddell, The New and Improved Bankruptcy Act of 1994, Nat'l B. 
Ass'n Mag., Jan.-Feb. 1995, at 8, 8. 
15. Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-598, 92 Stat. 2549 (codified as 
amended at 11 U.S.C. §§ 101-1330 (1994)). 
16. See 1 Epstein et al., supra note 13, § 1-5. Bankruptcy proceedings begin with the 
filing of a petition, usually by the debtor. Creditors, however, have a limited right to 
commence "involuntary" bankruptcy proceedings against debtors under Chapters 7 and 
11. The Bankruptcy Code establishes eligibility requirements for debtors under each 
chapter. See David G. Epstein, Bankruptcy and Other Debtor-Creditor Laws in a Nutshell 
143 (1995). 
17. See 1 Epstein et al., supra note 13, § 1-6. 
18. See 1 id. § 1-5. 
19. See 1 id. § 1-7(d). There are three exceptions to the policy of pro rata 
distribution: creditors with secured claims enjoy more favorable treatment; certain 
unsecured claims enjoy priority over other unsecured claims; and dividends must only be 
paid on allowed claims. See id. 
20. This Note uses masculine pronouns when referring to debtors because men seek 
discharge of marital debts in bankruptcy more often than women. See infra notes 74-79 
and accompanying text. 
21. See 1 Epstein et al., supra note 13, § 1-5. 
22. See 1 id. § 1-7(e); see also supra note 6 (defining discharge). When a debt is 
discharged, the creditor of the discharged debts receives only its pro rata distribution. See 
1 Epstein et al., supra note 13, § 1-7(e). 
23. See 1 id. § 1-5. 
24. See id. 
25. See 1 id. §§ 1-8 to 1-10. There are some differences among the various chapters 
regarding applicability of discharge. Under Chapter 11, the discharge occurs when the 
payment plan is confirmed, see 1 id. § 1-9(a)-(b), whereas under Chapters 12 and 13, 
discharge does not occur until the debtor has performed under the plan. See 1 id. §§ 1-
9(b), 1-10. There are fewer exceptions to discharge under Chapter 13 than under Chapter 
7. See 1 id. § 1-8. In fact, protection from discharge under the new section 523(a) (15) 
may not even be available under Chapter 13. See infra note 103. 
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To prevent the discharge of a specific debt, a creditor must initiate 
an "adversary proceeding."26 This adversary proceeding remains "within 
the main case to which it relates, and is usually heard by the bankruptcy 
court in much the same way as any lawsuit would be."27 The challenge is 
known as a complaint "to determine the dischargeability of a debt."28 
Just as bankruptcy has long figured on the legal landscape, family law 
historically has intersected with bankruptcy law in cases where debtors 
owe spouses or ex-spouses debts or support. The mechanics of divorce 
and separation agreements direc_tly impact bankruptcy proceedings re-
garding marital debts. Divorce may be achieved through litigation or set-
tlement, but as is the case with most other lawsuits, divorce usually is re-
solved by a settlement (or separation) agreement. 29 Courts commonly 
incorporate separation agreements into the divorce decree.30 Negotiat-
ing these agreements under the "traditional bargaining process" involves 
"manipulating labels [i.e., property division, child support, and alimony] 
to obtain an overall package that appeals to both parties."31 Although 
the various components of the package are largely fungible, emotional 
attitudes can affect the proceeding significantly, and certain tradeoffs, 
such as those beaveen money and child custody, can be hard to quantify 
and assess.32 Generally, property division awards are not modifiable, 
although maintenance and child support awards may be modified when 
there has been a substantial change in circumstances.33 Although both 
spouses are often liable to third parties for debts acquired during mar-
riage, usually one party will accept responsibility for the debts upon di-
vorce.34 This assumption of responsibility does not relieve the other 
26. Fed. R. Bankr. P. 7001. 
27. Peter C. Alexander, Divorce and the Dischargeability of Debts: Focusing on 
Women As Creditors in Bankruptcy, 43 Cath. U. L. Rev. 351, 357 (1994). 
28. Fed. R. Bankr. P. 7001(6). 
29. See Ira Mark Ellman et al., Family Law 688 (2d ed. 1991). Separation agreements 
are favored by law, "thus allowing a husband and wife, with the help of their respective 
attorneys, to contractually agree on a division of marital property and other assets, spousal 
and other child support, child custody matters, pension and retirement plans, insurance 
coverage, tax planning, and the like prior to divorce." Peter N. Swisher et al., Fanlily Law: 
Cases, Materials, and Problems 917 (1990). In fact, approximately 90% of all divorces are 
achieved through settlement rather than litigation. See Carl E. Schneider & Margaret F. 
Brinig, An Invitation to Fanlily Law 256 (1996). 
30. See Harry D. Krause, Family Law 176 (Black Letter Series, 2d ed. 1996). 
31. Ellman et al., supra note 29, at 690. Note that there are alternatives to this 
traditional process, such as mediation. See id. at 692-93. 
32. See id. at 690-91. 
33. See id. at 451-52. State court decrees regarding alimony and child support are 
routinely changed and adjusted accompanying a change in the circumstances of the 
parties. For example, one party's ability to pay may increase or decrease, and the needs of 
the recipients may change and evolve. In such cases, courts commonly modify prior 
decrees. See 2 Epstein et al., supra note 13, § 7~29(a). 
34. See Sheryl L. Scheible, Bankruptcy and the Modification of Support: Fresh Start, 
False Start, or Head Start?, 69 N.C. L. Rev. 577, 588 (1991). 
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party of liability to the creditor, but courts usually order the "assuming 
spouse to hold harmless and indemnify the other spouse. "35 
"It has not been uncommon for a party who is left in financial dis-
tress as a result of a divorce or property settlement order or who in his 
view received inequitable treatment in the family courts, to seek relief 
from the consequences of such orders by seeking to discharge debts in a 
bankruptcy."36 In 1901, the Supreme Court determined that alimony, 
maintenance, and support obligations were nondischargeable in bank-
ruptcy; in Audubon v. Shufedlt, the Court held that although the debtor 
would be excused from paying certain debts acquired before bankruptcy, 
he remained liable for alimony, which constituted an obligation to his 
family, rather than a dischargeable debt.37 Thus, the strain between pro-
tecting the debtor's discharge in order to provide him with a fresh start,38 
and the need of former spouses and children of bankruptcy debtors to 
enforce financial obligations under various family law agreements, has 
been a "frequent and well-developed source of litigation."39 
A. Discharge of Family Support Obligations Prior to the Bankruptcy Reform Act 
of 1994 
Prior to passage of the Reform Act, the Bankruptcy Code provided 
only limited safeguards for marital debt creditors-former spouses and 
children.40 Under the Bankruptcy Code, a debtor's obligations to former 
spouses and children are divided into support debts (alimony, mainte-
nance and support) and property division debts. Until the Reform Act 
added section 523(a)(15), this distinction determined whether a debt 
owed to a former spouse ·was dischargeable: while support debts were not 
dischargeable, property division debts were.4I 
35. Id. at 588-89. 
36. Campbell v. Campbell (In re Campbell), 198 B.R. 467, 470 (Bankr. D.S.C. 1996). 
37. See Audubon v. Shufeldt, 181 U.S. 575, 580 (1901). 
38. See Local Loan Co. v. Hunt, 292 U.S. 234, 244 (1934). 
39. McGarity, supra note 8. Societal preferences for private, individual support rather 
than support from the state may cause or exacerbate this tension. Cf. Martha Albertson 
Fineman, The Neutered Mother, The Sexual Family, and Other Twentieth Century 
Tragedies 212 (1995) (paternal responsibility relieves state of burden for children). 
Society may be reluctant to relieve the debtor of his obligations to his family and former 
spouse if the state would become responsible for their care. 
40. The Bankruptcy Code "reflected a philosophy that third party creditors be paid 
prior to the debtor and debtor's family and former spouse." Carlyon, supra note 7, at 16. 
41. The pertinent part of the statute, which was part of the 1978 Bankruptcy Code 
and which remains in force, reads as follows: 
§ 523. Exceptions to Discharge 
(a) A discharge under section 727, 1141, 1228(a), 1228(b), or 1328(b) of this 
title does not discharge an individual debtor from any debt-
(5) to a spouse, former spouse, or child of the debtor, for alimony to, 
maintenance for, or support of such spouse or child, in connection with a 
separation agreement, divorce decree or other order of a court of record, 
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The legislative history accompanying this provision specified that sec-
tion 523(a) (5) was designed to 
make nondischargeable any debts resulting from an agreement 
by the debtor to hold the debtor's spouse harmless on joint 
debts, to the extent that the agreement is in payment of ali-
mony, maintenance, or support of the spouse, as determined 
under bankruptcy law considerations that are similar to consid-
erations of whether a particular agreement to pay money to a 
spouse is actually alimony or a property settlement.42 
Thus, it \vas determined that "hold harmless provisions" -those provi-
sions in which the debtor assumes marital debt as part of the divorce 
decree, often in exchange for lower alimony or maintenance awards-
must "actually be in the nature of alimony, maintenance or support to be 
excepted from discharge. "43 
A typical case under the old Bankruptcy Code proceeded as follows. 
Husband and wife dissolve their marriage. As part of the terms of their 
Dissolution of Marriage, husband is ordered to assume certain joint debts 
and hold wife harmless for them. Both parties waive maintenance. Hus-
band subsequently files for bankruptcy and claims that the assumed joint 
debts are dischargeable, because they are not in the nature of alimony, 
maintenance, or support. The court finds that the parties intended that 
the balance of the dissolution agreement serve as a property settlement. 
Without consideration of any bargaining that might have been conducted 
between the former couple, or that the assumption of debt might have 
been meant as a supplement to child support, the court holds that the 
pledge to hold the wife harmless on certain debts is "in the nature of a 
property settlement and [the debts] are dischargeable in bankruptcy," 
leaving her responsible for such debts.44 
As this example suggests, the difference between property and sup-
port can be critical. Because of divorce reform that began in the 1970s, 
traditional alimony is largely in decline.45 As a result, property division 
often substitutes for alimony and provides support for ex-spouses.46 
Thus, even though "[d]ivorcing couples are generally concerned with the 
determination made in accordance with State or territorial law by a governmental 
unit, or property settlement agreement .... 
11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(5) (1994); see also McGarity, supra note 8 ("Until the [1994] Act added 
11 U.S.C. Section 523(a) (15), this classification meant that a support debt was excepted 
from discharge, and a property division debt was not."). Note that "[e]ven though this 
dichotomy is often meaningless in the family law context, each decree or settlement 
agreement being an interrelated and mutually dependent bundle of rights, it is necessary 
to classify each isolated obligation as a support debt or property division debt when the 
obligated party files a bankruptcy case." Id. 
42. H.R. Rep. No. 95-595, at 364 (1977), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.CAN. 5963, 6320. 
43. E.g., Mallin v. Mallin (In re Mallin), 137 B.R. 673, 677 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1992). 
44. Fitzsimmons v. Fitzsimmons (In re Fitzsimmons), llO B.R. 912, 915 (Bankr. E.D. 
Mo. 1990). 
45. See Scheible, supra note 34, at 587. 
46. See id. at 588. Professor Scheible explains further: 
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economic consequences of divorce, rather than the labels that attach to 
the arrangement's components,"47 the consequences of the support/ 
property dichotomy have been severe. Often, divorcing spouses have 
agreed to pay marital debts, holding the other spouse harmless from 
them, in exchange for lower alimony payments; in other instances, 
spouses have bargained for a larger property settlement rather than mari-
tal debt assumption.48 Under the old Bankruptcy Code, if the obligated 
spouse filed for bankruptcy, these property settlement obligations often 
were not considered in the nature of alimony, support, or maintenance, 
and were discharged. The statute forced courts to take an overly formalis-
tic view, often requiring them to focus myopically on the label attached to 
a particular marital debt, or manipulate the label in order to achieve an 
equitable outcome. This discharge had the effect of undoing a carefully-
wrought settlement to the detriment of the creditor who bargained a·way 
other opportunities or privileges. As a result, the nondebtor spouse often 
was "saddled with substantial debt and little or no alimony or support."49 
Many commentators and judges criticized the anomalous and unjust 
results of this dichotomy, urging reform "because of the injustice caused 
by the support/property division and to spare bankruptcy judges from 
the sophistry of reconciling the irreconcilable. "50 In fact, many bank-
ruptcy, district court, and circuit court judges expressed their distaste for 
discharging marital debts that, in all fairness, should have been borne by 
the debtor.51 For example, judge Posner, in his dissenting opinion in In 
Although the theory of property division is based on an allocation of assets 
acquired during marriage, equitable division principles frequently take into 
account factors traditionally considered in awarding alimony. Moreover, if 
division of marital assets in kind is impractical, courts may direct a spouse who 
receives a greater amount of property to repay the other in cash, often by means 
of a series of periodic payments. Although such payments resemble alimony, they 
represent ownership interests rather than support and are ordered as a definite, 
liquidated sum, and, thus, are nonmodifiable. 
Id. (footnotes omitted). 
47. Dresslerv. Dressler (In re Dressler), 194 B.R 290, 300 (Bankr. D.R.I. 1996)(citing 
Collins v. Hesson (In re Hesson), 190 B.R 229, 233 (Bankr. D. Md. 1995)). 
48. See H.R Rep. No. 103-835, at 54 (1994), reprinted in 1994 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3340, 
3363. 
49. H.R Rep. No. 103-835, at 54 (1994), reprinted in 1994 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3340, 3363. 
50. Hesson, 190 B.R at 235. For examples of such commentary, see, e.g., Alexander, 
supra note 27, at 392-93 (urging that jurisdiction of marital debts remain with family 
courts); Scheible, supra note 34, at 631-35 (advocating that bankruptcy courts abstain 
from determining nature of marital debts and defer to state courts); Ottilie Bello, 
Comment, Bankruptcy and Divorce: The Courts Send a Message to Congress, 13 Pace L. 
Rev. 643, 712 (1993) (maintaining that certain bankruptcy court decisions were "genuine 
outcries for legislation"); Renee Heotis, Conunent, Bankruptcy and Divorce: The 
Countervailing Policy Concerns, 13 Whittier L. Rev. 723, 745-53 (1992) (reviewing history 
of problem and noting lack of uniformity and judicial economy). See generally Sandra D. 
Freeburger & Claude Bowles, What Divorce Court Giveth, Bankruptcy Court Taketh Away: 
A Review of the Dischargeability of Marital Support Obligations, 24]. Fam. L. 587 (1986) 
(review of state law and divorce practitioner's guide to approaching Bankruptcy Code), 
51. See Bello, supra note 50, at 705-10. 
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re Sandeifoot remarked, "[w]hen a debtor uses the Code to steal from his 
former vvife we should not lightly conclude that the Code, properly read, 
commands such a result."52 
These complaints did not fall on completely deaf ears. The amend-
ments of the Reform Act of 1994 stemmed largely from legislative pres-
sure to make all marital obligations (including property division debts) 
nondischargeable, rather than only those expressly characterized as ali-
mony, maintenance, or support.53 
B. The Amendment As Adopted 
The final version of the amendment accomplished a change less rad-
ical than preventing the discharge of all property division debts, but still 
spoke to concerns of critics of the old Bankruptcy Code.54 Congress's 
goal was to protect alimony, support, and maintenance obligations more 
effectively:55 those proposing the amendments believed that "a debtor 
should not use the protection of a bankruptcy filing in order to avoid 
legitimate marital and child support obligations."56 The final version of 
"the most sw·eeping change in bankruptcy law, as it relates to domestic 
relations, since the passage of the Bankruptcy Act of 1898 and the deci-
52. Farrey v. Sanderfoot (In re Sanderfoot), 899 F.2d 598, 607 (7th Cir. 1990) 
(Posner,J., dissenting), rev'd, 500 U.S. 291 (1991). 
53. See Mary D. Scott & Kimberley F. Woodyard, Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1994 
Sections Affecting Secured Lenders, May 4, 1994, at *301, *338-40 (A.L.I.-A.B.A. Resource 
Materials, Banking and Commercial Lending Law), available in Westlaw, TP-AIJ.. Database, 
C995AU-ABA301. 
Representative Henry J. Hyde first proposed an amendment to make all property 
settlement obligations nondiscbargeable in 1984, and continued to resubmit the bill. See 
Bello, supra note 50, at 710-11 & nn.521-23 (citing Telephone Interview with George M. 
FiShman, Legislative Aide to Rep. Henry J. Hyde (Oct. 16, 1991)). 
54. The new exception to discharge created by the Reform Act originated in H.R 
4711, 103d Cong. (1994), introduced by Representative Slaughter. This bill proposed that 
property settlement debts "assumed or incurred" be nondischargeable, see id., and that 
the debt would not be discharged unless paying the debt would be an undue hardship and 
the benefit of the discharge outweighed the detriment to the creditor. See Scott & 
Woodyard, supra note 53, at *338. The "undue hardship" standard was developed in the 
context of student loans, and "could provide a measure of predictability in the outcome of 
a particular case" because a substantial body of law had developed around the test in the 
bankruptcy context. McGarity, supra note 8. The original proposal was eventually 
rejected, and "the final product created a more limited exception." Scott & Woodyard, 
supra note 53, at *339. 
55. See H.R Rep. No. 103-835, at 54 (1994), reprinted in 1994 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3340, 
3363. Note that reform in this area of bankruptcy law corresponds with rising concerns 
regarding "deadbeat dads." See, e.g., Child Support Recovery Act of 1992, 18 U.S.C. § 228 
(1994). One commentator noted: "The plight of vast numbers of American children 
entitled to but not receiving adequate support by noncustodial parents has not failed to 
attract the attention of Congress. The economic disadvantage experienced by some 
former spouses of bankruptcy debtors has likewise created an impetus for change." 
McGarity, supra note 8. 
56. H.R Rep. No. 103-835, at 54 (1994), reprinted in 1994 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3340, 3363. 
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sion of Audubon v. Shujeldf'57 provides that property debts to an ex-spouse 
will be discharged only if paying the debt would reduce the debtor's in-
come below that necessary for the support of the debtor and his depen-
dents, or if the benefit to the debtor from discharge outweighs the harm 
to the nondebtor ex-spouse. 58 This two-pronged inquiry allows discharge 
if either of the two requirements are met. 
In the legislative history, the Committee on the Judiciary expressed 
its belief that "payment of support needs must take precedence over 
property settlement debts," but also cautioned that "[t]he benefits of the 
debtor's discharge should be sacrificed only if there would be substantial 
detriment to the nondebtor spouse that outweighs the debtor's need for 
a fresh start."59 Thus, although concerned with the plight of the dis-
advantaged creditor spouse, the Committee remained concerned for the 
debtor, and did not wish for debts to remain nondischargeable where the 
nondebtor spouse could easily pay them. The resulting test allows dis-
charge of some, but not all, property settlement debts. 
C. Beyond Bankruptcy Law 
Social realities beyond the world of bankruptcy jurisprudence oblige 
bankruptcy courts to respect and insure the integrity offamily court judg-
ments whenever possible. In considering the context of the amendment, 
it is important to recognize that women are uniquely situated: they are 
creditors in these discharge proceedings in much higher numbers than 
men, and are more harmed by discharge. 6° Consideration of how women 
are affected by divorce and bankruptcy, along with their economic status 
in general, is therefore essential. 61 
57. Claude R. Bowles, Matrimonial Implications of the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 
1994, 15 Fair$hare 3, 3 (1995). 
58. The amendment, as codified in the Bankruptcy Code, reads: 
§ 523. Exceptions to Discharge 
(a) A discharge under section 727, 1141, 1228(a), 1228(b), or 1328(b) of this title 
does not discharge an individual debtor from any debt-
(15) not of the kind described in paragraph (5) that is incurred by the debtor in 
the course of a divorce or separation or in connection with a separation 
agreement, divorce decree or other order of a court of record, a determination 
made in accordance with State or territorial law by a governmental unit unless-
(A) the debtor does not have the ability to pay such debt from income or 
property of the debtor not reasonably necessary to be expended for the 
maintenance or support of the debtor or a dependent of the debtor and, if the 
debtor is engaged in a business, for the payment of expenditures necessary for 
the continuation, preservation, and operation of such a business; or (B) 
discharging such debt would result in a benefit to the debtor that outweighs the 
detrimental consequences to a spouse, former spouse, or child of the debtor .... 
11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(15) (1994). 
59. H.R. Rep. No. 103-835, at 54 (1994), reprinted in 1994 U.S.C.C.AN. 3340, 3363. 
60. See infra Part I.C.2. 
61. For further commentary on the impact of divorce and bankruptcy on women, 
written before the amendments, see Alexander, supra note 27, at 363-69. 
1997] BANKRUPTCY AND DIVORCE 101 
The special circumstances of women in the wake of divorce and in 
the workforce require federal bankruptcy courts to respect, rather than 
defeat, settlements imposed by family courts. "Women often must face 
the double-barreled emotional and financial impact of a divorce followed 
by the filing of a bankruptcy petition by their ex-husband."62 The harsh 
financial effects of divorce substantially result from a combination of 
three factors: women are likely to suffer a decrease in standard of living 
after divorce; women generally earn less and are subject to more obsta-
cles in the workforce; and men more often seek discharge in bankruptcy 
proceedings. 
1. Divorce and Economic Vuibility.- Women are often jeopardized ec-
onomically following divorce. Unlike men, women and children usually 
experience a marked decrease in their standard of living after divorce. 63 
This quick drop in standard of living leaves women accustomed to a mid-
dle class lifestyle struggling at the poverty level.64 Those who did not 
work outside the home prior to divorce must cope with an additional 
burden: the search for a job and adjustment to professional work envi-
ronments after many years at home.65 Further complicating the situa-
tion, divorces involving young children usually end with women assuming 
custody.66 
Other realities compound these problems. First, men and women 
do not experience the "tradeoffs and tensions" of work and family life in 
the same ways. 67 Because the sex-role revolution has yet to reach home-
making and childcare responsibilities, women remain at a distinct dis-
advantage. 68 Second, years of gender discrimination in the workforce 
have made it difficult, if not impossible, for women to become primary 
62. Id. at 363 (citations omitted); see also id. at 363 n.60 (noting that bankruptcy 
frequently follows divorce). Other authors and scholars have also noted this phenomenon. 
See, e.g., Heotis, supra note 50, at 723. 
63. See Judith Areen, Cases and Materials on Family Law 711 (3d ed. 1992) 
(describing study finding wives and children twelve times more likely than men to be on 
welfare after divorce or separation, while husbands experienced increase in spendable 
income). 
64. See Alexander, supra note 27, at 364-65. 
65. "[F]ulltime homemakers run the risk that divorce will leave them with inadequate 
skills for earning a living at a paid job." Victor R. Fuchs, Women's Quest for Economic 
Equality 74 (1988). 
66. See Homer H. Clark, Jr., The Law of Domestic Relations in the United States 787 
(2d ed. 1988). 
67. See Fuchs, supra note 65, at 58-74. 
68. See id. Women bear the burdens of both work and childcare, effectively working 
a "second shift" when they arrive home for the day. See Arlie Hochschild, The Second 
Shift: Working Parents and the Revolution at Home 3 (1989) (over year women work extra 
month of twenty-four hour days). Consequently, "[w]omen's homemaking responsibilities 
reduce their earnings, and, in a feedback loop, the lower earnings induce behavior that 
further depresses women's labor market opportunities." Fuchs, supra note 65, at 64. 
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wage-earners. 69 Employers discriminate against working women through 
the imposition of gender-specific work requirements70 and the invocation 
of women's "differences" as justification for their absence from tradition-
ally male jobs.71 Women may also confront sexual harassment at work, 
frustrating their efforts at mobility and even causing them to leave their 
jobs.72 
69. Economic reality dictates that "so long as men earn a great deal more than 
women, it is income-maximizing for the couple to place greater weight on the husband's 
career." Fuchs, supra note 65, at 64. 
70. Under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000 (1994), 
employers have been allowed to impose neutral job requirements on a sex-specific basis, 
which has the effect of mitigating liability for actions based solely on sex. These 
requirements often hinder women's mobility and promotion. See, e.g., Craft v. 
Metromedia, Inc., 572 F. Supp. 868 (W.D. Mo. 1983) (holding that Title VII does not 
prohibit employer from imposing reasonable, but different, standards of appearance for 
men and women), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 766 F.2d 1205 (8th Cir. 1985). Courts have 
held that different appearance standards for men and women are not invalid if both sexes 
are screened with respect to a neutral fact. See, e.g., Willingham v. Macon Tel. Pub. Co., 
507 F.2d 1084 (5th Cir. 1975) (different hair length requirements for men and women 
valid because both were being screened with respect to community grooming standards). 
This does not preclude such standards from having a negative, disparate impact on 
women: women may still be discharged from their jobs based upon such differing 
standards. 
Furthermore, Title VII permits gender-based discrimination "in those certain 
instances where ... sex ... is a bona fide occupational qualification ["BFOQ"] reasonably 
necessary to the normal operation of that panicular business or enterprise." 42 U.S.C. 
§ 2000e-2(e) (1994). Thus, in certain instances where sex is considered a BFOQ for the 
normal operation of a job or enterprise, sex-based discrimination is permitted in hiring. 
Unfortunately, male qualities are sometimes considered "proxies" for certain job 
requirements, such as height and weight, and effectuate the permissible exclusion of 
women from jobs. See, e.g., Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321 (1977) (despite disparate 
impact on women applicants, height and weight requirements held to be reasonable 
BFOQs for employment as prison guard). In other cases, BFOQs serve to perpetuate 
stereotypes and the sexual objectification of women. See, e.g., Wilson v. Southwest Airlines 
Co., 517 F. Supp. 292 (N.D. Tex. 1981) (defendant argued unsuccessfully that it could 
discriminate against males because "attractive female flight attendants and ticket agents" 
personified airline's "sexy image" and fulfilled its public promise to "take passengers 
skyward with" 'love'"). Both practices hinder women's true equality in the workforce. 
71. Women are often poorly represented in the higher paying, traditionally male 
positions. Employers have successfully argued that women are significantly absent from 
certain traditionally male jobs by choice. See, e.g., EEOC v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 839 
F.2d 302 (7th Cir. 1988) (women not in field of commission sales because they were not 
interested). However, employers-wittingly or not-form gender-biased work structures 
and processes that prevent women from aspiring to nontraditional jobs. See Vicki Schultz, 
Telling Stories About Women and Work: Judicial Interpretations of Sex Segregation in the 
Workplace in Title VII Cases Raising the Lack of Interest Argument, 103 Harv. L. Rev. 
1749, 1840 (1990) (arguing that law has capacity to change employer practices and 
therefore, women's occupational preferences through Title VII, but fails to realize its 
potential). The net effect is to relegate women to lower paying jobs, thus reducing their 
potential for self-support. 
72. A woman may be denied actual material benefits if she refuses to participate in 
sexual activities with an employer. This happens in the context of "quid pro quo" sexual 
harassment, where concrete employment benefits are conditioned on sexual favors. See, 
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Women's efforts to achieve economic independence are thwarted by 
the combination of divorce, work, and family life-problems further ag-
gravated by pervasive discriminatory employment practices. This can 
make financial survival impossible without additional economic support, 
of which divorce settlements constitute an important component. Up-
heaval of the court-mandated economic order via subsequent bankruptcy 
action can have drastic financial and emotional consequences. 73 It is 
therefore especially harsh to deprive women of support through dis-
charge in bankruptcy. Subsequent courts should be loathe to disturb the 
delicate balance that the state coUrt has established. 
2. Women and Bankruptcy. -In the context of marital debt discharge 
proceedings, women interact with the bankruptcy system in different ca-
pacities and numbers than men, and the system treats them differently. 
Recently, Professor Peter Alexander conducted empirical research 
focusing on the gender of parties in section 523(a)(5) (marital debt) dis-
putes. 74 His research concluded that men seek discharge of marital debts 
in bankruptcy more often than women. 75 Professor Alexander gathered 
statistics from United States bankruptcy courts in the Central District of 
Illinois and the Middle District of Pennsylvania to determine the number 
of section 523(a) (5) adversary complaints filed in 1992 and the gender of 
the debtors and plaintiffs. 76 In the Central District of Tilinois, twenty-
eight adversary complaints were filed under section 523(a) (5). Of the 
twenty-eight complaints, men were the debtors seeking discharge of debts 
in twenty-six cases and women were the debtors in only two. 77 Similarly, 
in the Middle District of Pennsylvania, of the eight complaints filed pur-
suant to section 523(a) (5), men were debtors in six cases while women 
were debtors in only two.78 At the appellate level, cases almost always 
involve a husband who has filed for bankruptcy and is appealing a finding 
that his family obligations are not dischargeable. 79 
e.g., Meritor Savings Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57 (1986). Alternatively, a woman'sjob 
performance may be impaired by the presence of severe and pervasive harassment on the 
job that does not direcdy affect economic benefits. This is "hostile environment" 
discrimination. See id. 
73. Cf. Alexander, supra note 27, at 363-65 (urging consideration of the traumatic 
impact of divorce on women when assessing the fairness of discharge). 
74. See id. at 368. 
75. See id. 
76. See id. 
77. See id. 
78. See id. While this empirical research is not conclusive, it is highly suggestive. 
Professor Alexander also reviewed the annotations listed after 11 U.S.CA § 523 (West 
1993) and found that out of the 92 decisions reported, the man was the debtor in 84 cases, 
the woman was the debtor in five cases, and the remaining three cases were joint filings. 
See id. at 368 n.88. 
79. See 2 Epstein et al., supra note 13, § 7-29. 
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Cases in this area illustrate that a woman's involvement in discharge 
proceedings can be tremendously burdensome. 80 Male debtors who file 
for bankruptcy after divorce often know that their wives will not have the 
financial means to challenge discharge, and may use this knowledge to 
leverage desirable settlements.81 Thus, "[t]he ambiguity ... , the uncer-
tainty and unpredictability of court decisions, and the weak financial posi-
tion of many ex-wives following a divorce are all factors which seem to 
entice the debtor to seek the discharge."82 Furthermore, women can still 
"lose" in the bankruptcy context even when debts are eventually ruled 
nondischargeable. Because the domestic relations exceptions to dis-
charge promote litigation, women who have already suffered financially 
following divorce must exhaust time and money just to maintain that 
which the divorce court decided was rightfully theirs.83 Those women 
who are not successful in protecting their awards from discharge-and 
many who are-will have expended resources only to be left 
impoverished. 84 
Courts and other observers have begun to recognize that there is a 
true empirical difference in the treatment of men and women in bank-
ruptcy proceedings. The Ninth Circuit's Gender Bias Task Force reports: 
The Advisory Committee on Bankruptcy asked whether there 
were any distinctive characteristics of bankruptcy law and prac-
tice that implicated gender. The Committee concluded that wo-
men and men may indeed be differently affected. 
Despite common perception, that bankruptcy is about com-
merce, and that commercial activity is predominantly the activity 
of men, the Advisory Committee learned that, as an empirical 
matter, a large proportion of the litigants in bankruptcy are wo-
men, appearing as creditors and debtors. Despite the numbers 
of women who are litigants, the Advisory Committee reported 
that bankruptcy practice remains predominantly male. Further, 
bankruptcy law brings federal courts into areas of law not often 
associated with federal law; because of conflicts between obliga-
tions of support, imposed under state law, and federal bank-
ruptcy protections accorded debtors, bankruptcy judges must 
now consider how state efforts to enable collection of obliga-
tions owed to former spouses are affected by federal bankruptcy 
interpretations of dischargeable debts. The failure of spouses to 
obtain such family support from former spouses may, in turn, 
trigger the filing ofbankruptcy. Moreover, the bankruptcy law's 
reliance on "family" as the relevant unit may have a negative ef-
80. See Alexander, supra note 27, at 387-88 (describing In re Davidson, 133 B.R. 795 
(N.D. Tex. 1990), rev'd on other grounds, 947 F.2d 1294 (5th Cir. 1991), where battle over 
discharge began with divorce in 1983, and ensued until debt was ultimately found 
nondischargeable in 1991). 
81. See id. at 387. 
82. Id. 
83. See id at 388. 
84. See id. 
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feet on the spouse who has not incurred the debts and may wish 
to stay out of bankruptcy. 85 
105 
Thus, even when the bankruptcy laws are not facially discriminatory, they 
have a disproportionately negative impact on women. 86 
D. Family Law in Federal Courts? 
Federal courts weighing the dischargeability of marital debts find 
themselves at a peculiar junction: the familiar terrain of bankruptcy and 
the generally eschewed territory of family law. Although Congress has 
given bankruptcy courts the power to consider whether a separation 
agreement qualifies as support or property (and now mandates that bank-
ruptcy courts determine whether property debts are to be discharged), 
federal courts traditionally have been reluctant to involve themselves in 
family law matters. In Ankenbrandt v. Richards, the Supreme Court reaf-
firmed the "domestic relations exception," noting the long-standing prac-
tice of the Supreme Court and other federal courts to refrain from hear-
ing such matters.87 This traditional reluctance to get involved, coupled 
with real problems that the bankruptcy bench has encountered in apply-
ing provisions of the Bankruptcy Code relating to domestic relations, has 
provoked commentators to recommend that bankruptcy courts abstain 
from hearing such matters88 or that the Bankruptcy Code be amended so 
as not to require that bankruptcy judges deliberate on them at al1.89 
There are several reasons to be concerned with federal courts deter-
mining the dischargeability of marital debts. First, hearings by bank-
ruptcy courts may be reduced to relitigation of divorce issues with which 
one of the parties is unhappy.90 Though bankruptcy courts frequently 
85. The Ninth Circuit Gender Bias Task Force, The Effects of Gender in the Federal 
Courts: The Final Report of the Ninth Circuit Gender Bias Task Force 135-36 (1993). 
86. See Sheila Driscoll, Consumer Bankruptcy and Gender, 83 Geo. LJ. 525, 557 
(1994). Driscoll notes: 
I d. 
Although the bankruptcy laws are not facially discriminatory toward female 
debtors, the unique circumstances of women in society-particularly the 
phenomenon of the feminization of poverty-may allow the bankruptcy laws to 
have a disparate impact on women in and out of bankruptcy. The various 
barriers to access to the bankruptcy system may particularly affect women hecause 
women in general are poorer than men and because women may not have equal 
access to information about bankruptcy protection. 
87. See Ankenbrandt v. Richards, 504 U.S. 689, 693-94 (1992). The case involved 
child abuse and, although not applying it in the specific case, established that there is a 
domestic relations exception to federal diversity jurisdiction. For a critical examination of 
the domestic relations exception, see generally Naomi R Cahn, Family Law, Federalism, 
and the Federal Courts, 79 Iowa L. Rev. 1073 (1994) (arguing that "double stranded 
federalism explains [federal courts') unwillingness to decide family law cases," and 
advocating federal court jurisdiction). 
88. See Alexander, supra note 27, at 397; Scheible, supra note 34, at 577. 
89. See Bello, supra note 50, at 715-18. 
90. See, e.g.,Johnston v. Henson (In re Henson), 197 B.R 299, 302 (Bankr. E.D. Ark. 
1996) ("[T]his bankruptcy is merely an extension of the divorce proceedings. . . . [The 
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deal with discharge, the relationship of a debtor to an arm's length credi-
tor stands in stark contrast to the relationship between the debtor and 
creditor in domestic bankruptcy proceedings. In this domestic context, a 
court may explore the lifestyles and personal histories of the parties, as 
well as witness emotional tensions between them. Although bankruptcy 
judges may argue that they are independently reviewing the facts to ad-
dress issues particular to their courts, they often review the same ques-
tions as the divorce judges preceding them. Indeed, they frequently con-
sider many of the same factors in making their determinations ofwhether 
to characterize a debt as property or support, such as the length of the 
marriage, the parties' intent or understanding, the health of the parties, 
and their earning potential.91 
Second, bankruptcy courts may lack the procedural and substantive 
tools to determine whether marital debts should be discharged. Unlike 
family court judges, bankruptcy judges have not been privy to the parties' 
testimony at the time of divorce and may not know with certainty how the 
parties intended to characterize their obligations. 92 Even if evidence is 
admitted from the state court proceeding, the judges cannot witness the 
testimony first-hand. They are unable to observe other nonverbal 
messages and dynamics of the couple's relationship at the time of di-
vorce. 93 To the extent that they must consider the circumstances under 
which the marital settlement was negotiated, these factors leave the bank-
ruptcy courts considerably disadvantaged in determining the dis-
chargeability of a debt. Perhaps because of this lack of experience and 
expertise, bankruptcy courtjudges94 have expressed discomfort with their 
involvement in domestic relations. The bankruptcy courts "do not want 
debtor] did not like the outcome of the divorce proceedings an'd wishes to continue that 
contest. Unfortunately, Congress has unwittingly provided him with an opportunity to do 
so in the federal courts."); see also Alexander, supra note 27, at 373 ("Is the federal 
bankruptcy court violating the basic civil procedure principles of res judicata and collateral 
estoppel in addressing what appears to be the same issues and/ or claims that the state 
divorce court already addressed in distributing marital assets and obligations?"). 
91. See Alexander, supra note 27, at 374 & n.ll4. Professor Alexander notes the 
similarities between factors listed in Daulton v. Daulton (In re Daulton), 139 B.R. 708, 710 
(Bankr. C.D. lll. 1992), and the factors listed by Martha Fineman as affecting property 
division upon divorce. See Martha Albertson Fineman, The Illusion of Equality: The 
Rhetoric and Reality of Divorce Reform 40-41 (1991). 
92. See Alexander, supra note 27, at 379. Professor Sheryl Scheible suggests that state 
courts are the preferable arena for a variety of reasons: they show a greater interest in 
protecting former spouses and children from a loss of support; they have more experience 
and expertise in evaluating the competing interests of the parties; they are more familiar 
with local economics in relation to the parties' needs and often employ specially trained 
personnel; they are L'l a better position to analyze the competing policy interests in 
modifying a support award; they are accustomed to weighing economic and noneconomic 
factors in such proceedings; and they have the power to increase as well as decrease the 
amount of marital support awarded. See Scheible, supra note 34, at 636. 
93. See Alexander, supra note 27, at 379. 
94. See id. at 369 & n.92 (citing interviews with several bankruptcy judges who 
commented that bankruptcy issues are being taken over by nonbankruptcy issues, such as 
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to crowd their dockets with matters that seem only tangentially related to 
bankruptcy law .... "95 They do not want to sit as "'super-divorce' 
courts,"96 and anecdotal evidence suggests that some bankruptcy judges 
would prefer that jurisdiction over marital debts remain with divorce 
courts.97 Bankruptcy courts are not situated to consider adequately 
noneconomic factors, and so should avoid such considerations. 
Although bankruptcy courts may not be expert in the nuances of 
domestic relations, they do have substantial experience in bankruptcy 
law, which should remain the focus of discharge litigation. The concerns 
articulated above suggest that bankruptcy judges should strive to limit 
their determinations as much as possible to the relative economic posi-
tions of the two parties, and accept prior family court determinations re-
garding the intent and actions of the parties during and after marriage. 
II. CURRENT ENFORCEMENT OF THE REFORM Ac:r 
The new amendments are a conscientious and necessary augmenta-
tion of the Bankruptcy Code's previously inadequate protection of mari-
tal debts. While problems remain, the amendments have successfully 
shielded more marital debts from discharge.98 Notwithstanding 
Congress's efforts, however, difficulties in evaluating the support/prop-
erty dichotomy remain. Reviews of the statute from the bankruptcy bar 
and bench have been mixed. Likewise, a survey of the case law to date 
reveals a judiciary perplexed by the amendments and unable to find tena-
ble standards to apply. 
A. Continuing Difficulties in Discharge Analysis 
Congress's laudable intentions in passing reform have been frus-
trated by the absence of substantial legislative history or explicit standards 
to guide enforcement. Bankruptcy judges are left with little direction on 
procedural and interpretive issues. Under the Reform Act, determining 
the dischargeability of marital debts involves sections 523(a) (5) and 
domestic relations matters, and that this phenomenon contributes to increasing 
workload). 
95. Id. at 392. 
96. Long v. Calhoun (In re Calhoun), 715 F.2d 1103, 1110 n.12 (6th Cir. 1983). 
97. See Collins v. Hesson (In re Hesson), 190 B.R. 229, 236 (Bankr. D. Md. 
1995)(citing Alexander, supra note 27, and noting that Professor Alexander advises 
"[m]uch to the prayers of some bankruptcy judges that jurisdiction over marital debts 
should remain in the divorce court with the bankruptcy court serving as an adjunct to 
enforce the state court orders"); cf. Schmitt v. Eubanks (In re Schmitt), 197 B.R. 312, 317 
(Bankr. W.D. Ark. 1996)(stating that section 523(a)(15)(B) was "an issue Congress 
foolishly placed exclusively before the federal courts rather than state domestic and family 
courts which are clearly the courts with the expertise to assess need of the former spouses 
and their families" and arguing that state courts should have concurrent jurisdiction). 
98. See infra note 126. 
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523(a) (15).99 The court first decides under section 523(a) (5) whether 
the debt incurred as part of the divorce decree to a spouse, former 
spouse, or child of the debtor is "for alimony to, maintenance for, or 
support of such spouse or child," or is more appropriately characterized 
as a property division debt.100 In classifying marital debts, bankruptcy 
courts have considered as many as twenty factors.101 If the court deter-
mines that the debt is in the nature of alimony, maintenance, or support, 
the debt cannot be discharged and the inquiry ends.102 
If the court instead finds the marital debt to be a property division 
debt, it is no longer automatically dischargeable. Such a finding triggers 
the two-pronged inquiry of the new section 523(a)(15).10S Under the 
new section, the property debt may not be discharged unless the debtor 
does not have the ability to pay the debt, or unless the benefit of the 
discharge to the debtor outweighs any detrimental consequences of such 
99. For proceedings under section 523(a) (15), the Reform Act applies prospectively 
to bankruptcies filed after October 22, 1994. See 11 U.S.C. § 101 note (1994) (Effective 
Date of 1994 Amendment). Unlike cases under section 523(a) (5), which may be tried in 
state or federal court, cases under section 523(a) (15) are under exclusive jurisdiction of 
the federal courts. See 11 U.S.C. § 523(c)(1). This distinction from section 523(a)(5) 
actions is important because it creates what some have termed a "procedural trap ... for 
the unwary creditor spouse." See Michaela M. White, Divorce After the Bankruptcy 
Reform Act of 1994: Can You Stay Warm After You Split the Blanket?, 29 Creighton L. Rev. 
617, 626 ( 1996). The creditor spouse must file an adversary proceeding within sixty days of 
the first meeting of the creditors, or the debt will be discharged. See Fed. R. Bankr. P. 
4007(c)(1994). The creditor could still argue in state or federal court that the debt is in 
the nature of alimony, maintenance, or support under section 523(a)(5), and therefore 
not dischargeable. However, if the court determines that it is a property settlement debt, 
the debt could be considered discharged because of failure to raise the property settlement 
claim in federal court in a timely manner. See White, supra, at 627. 
100. 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(5). 
101. Some of the factors are quite similar to those used in section 523(a) (15) 
determinations. See Alexander, supra note 27, at 361 n.54 (citing Daulton v. Daulton, 139 
B.R. 708 (Bankr. C.D. Til. 1992)). Since such factors are "weighted differently ... across 
the country," commentators have criticized their use. Id. at 361-62. 
Among such factors, considerable attention has been devoted to determining the 
intent of the parties at the time of the dissolution of the marriage. See Scheible, supra 
note 34, at 594-96. 
Note also that the "bankruptcy court makes an assessment and characterization of 
evidence independent from the divorce court's previous findings." Alexander, supra note 
27, at 360 (foomote omitted). 
102. See 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(5). 
103. See 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(15). It should be noted that debts that are not 
discharged under Chapter 7 and Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code may still be 
dischargeable under Chapter 13, which allows fewer exceptions to discharge. See Bowles, 
supra note 57, at 5; McGarity, supra note 8. But see In re Auld, 187 B.R. 351, 352 (Bankr. 
D. Kan. 1995) (holding section 523(a) (15) exception was not dischargeable under section 
1328(a), but incorporating new test into section 1328(b) "hardship discharge" 
determination). For a general sketch of the differences among these chapters, see supra 
notes 16-25 and accompanying text. 
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discharge to the spouse, former spouse, or child.104 Although a creditor 
seeking a judgment of nondischargeability normally bears the burden of 
proof beyond a preponderance of the evidence,105 in property division 
cases the debtor will most likely bear the burden.106 
104. See 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(15). Several approaches have emerged regarding the 
appropriate date for measuring ability to pay and impact of discharge. Some early cases 
determined that the correct time for assessing the relative conditions of the parties is at the 
time of bankruptcy filing. See, e.g.; Anthony v. Anthony (In re Anthony), 190 B.R. 433, 
438 (Bankr. N.D. Ala. 1995); Carroll v. Carroll (In re Carroll}, 187 B.R. 197, 200 (Bankr. 
S.D. Ohio 1995); Becker v. Becker (In re Becker}, 185 B.R. 567, 570 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 
1995). Other courts measure at the time of trial. See, e.g., Dressler v. Dressler (In re 
Dressler}, 194 B.R. 290, 300 (Bankr. D.R.I.1996); Bodilyv. Morris (In re Morris}, 193 B.R. 
949, 952 (Bankr. S.D. Cal. 1996); Gantz v. Gantz (In re Gantz}, 192 B.R. 932, 934 (Bankr. 
N.D. lll. 1996); Beicher v. Owens (In re Owens}, 191 B.R. 669, 674 (Bankr. E.D. Ky. 1996); 
Collins v. Hesson (In re Hesson}, 190 B.R. 229, 238 (Bankr. D. Md. 1995). Finally, some 
courts expand the inquiry into present and future circumstances. See, e.g., Schmitt v. 
Eubanks (In re Schmitt}, 197 B.R. 312, 316 (Bankr. W.D. Ark. 1996); McGinnis v. 
McGinnis (In re McGinnis}, 194 B.R. 917, 920 (Bankr. N.D. Ala.1996); In re Smither, 194 
B.R. 102, 107 (Bankr. W.D. Ky. 1996); Scottv. Scott (In re Scott), 194B.R. 375,380 (Bankr. 
D.S.C. 1995). 
105. See Grogan v. Garner, 498 U.S. 279, 287 (1991). In certain circumstances, 
however, such as when a debtor seeks to discharge a student loan, the debtor is required to 
show circumstances meriting the dischargeability of a debt. See Bachner v. Dlinois ex rei. 
Ill. Student Assistance Comm'n (In re Bachner}, 165 B.R. 875, 880-81 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 
1994). 
106. The new amendment is silent on the issue of burden of proof, see 11 U.S.C. 
§ 523(a) (15}, and a split of authority on this issue has already emerged. See White, supra 
note 99, at 628-30. For extensive discussion of this split, see Stone v. Stone (In re Stone), 
199 B.R. 753, 758-85 (Bankr. N.D. Ala. 1996). 
The majority of courts, in construing the new amendment, have held that the burden 
of proof is on the debtor. See, e.g., Anthony, 190 B.R. at 436; Phillips v. Phillips (In re 
Phillips}, 187 B.R. 363, 368 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1995); Carroll, 187 B.R. at 200; Becker, 185 
B.R. at 569; Hill v. Hill (In re Hill}, 184 B.R. 750, 753 (Bankr. N.D. Til. 1995). 
Bankruptcy Judge Richard DeGunther explained the policy that necessitates this 
result: 
Section (A) of 523(a) (15) requires a showing that the Debtor does not have 
ability to pay. If the burden is placed on the Plaintiff to show the Debtor does not 
have. the ability to pay, the Plaintiff would want to fail to meet the burden. 
Similarly, section (B) requires a showing that discharging the debt would result in 
a greater benefit to the Debtor. Again, if the burden is on the Plaintiff, the 
Plaintiff would want to fail to meet the burden. Thus, by the very nature of 
Section 523(a) (15), the burden of the exceptions must shift to the Debtor. 
The burden shift amplifies the policy that even though the debtor ordinarily is 
entitled to a discharge of debts in bankruptcy, the debtor must at times show he 
or she is deserving of the dischargeability of a particular debt. 
Hill, 184 B.R. at 753-54; see also McGarity, supra note 8 ("[l]t appears that once an action 
has been filed the burden of production of evidence shifts to the debtor to show inability 
to pay or to show that the benefit of the discharge to ·the debtor outweighs the detriment 
to the creditor."). 
In contrast, some courts place the burden squarely on the objecting creditor. See, 
e.g., Willey v. Willey (In re Willey}, 198 B.R. 1007, 1013 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1996); Adie v. 
Adie (In re Adie}, 197 B.R. 8, 9 n.1 (Bankr. D.N.H. 1996); Dressler, 194 B.R. at 304; Kessler 
v. Butler (In re Butler), 186 B.R. 371, 373 (Bankr. D. Vt. 1995); see also Woodworth v. 
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The first prong of the new test-ability to pay-is relatively straight-
forward and objective.107 If the debtor is unable to pay without jeopardiz-
ing support of himself, his business, or his dependents, the debt is dis-
charged without further inquiry.108 The more difficult task comes in 
applying section 523(a) (15) (B)-the balancing test that weighs the bene-
fit of discharge to the debtor against the detriment to the creditor.109 
One bankruptcy judge characterized the inquiry this way: 
Section 523(a) (15) (B) requires this Court to exercise its pure 
equitable powers. To apply this section as Congress intended, 
this Court must in essence evaluate the lifestyles of the parties 
and measure the benefit of former husband's discharge against 
the degree of harm suffered by former wife. The legislative his-
tory of this section essentially requires this Court to make a 
value judgment in deciding which party suffers the most.110 
It is in this area that courts have had the most difficulty discerning stan-
dards for guidance. With little direction from Congress111 and no analo-
gous provision elsewhere in the Bankruptcy Code,112 a variety of stan-
dards, often collectively articulated as a "totality of the circumstances 
Woodworth (In re Woodworth), 187 B.R. 174, 177 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1995)(relying on 
case decided before section 523(a) (15) was passed). 
Finally, a few courts use a bifurcated burden of proof, holding that the debtor has the 
burden to prove inability to pay under section 523(a) (15) (A), then the burden shifts to the 
creditor to show that the detrimental consequences to the creditor outweigh the benefits 
to the debtor under section 523(a)(15)(B). See, e.g., In re Patterson, 199 B.R. 21, 22 
(Bankr. W.D. Ky. 1996); Morris v. Morris (In re Morris), I97 B.R. 236, 243 (Bankr. N.D. W. 
Va. 1996); Hesson, 190 B.R. at 239. 
A full analysis of this question is beyond the scope of this Note. It should be noted, 
however, that the new amendments would benefit from a uniform standard in this area. 
107. A number of courts have noted that the phrase "ability to pay" essentially mimics 
the language of section 1325(b)(2), which is known as the "disposable income test." See, 
e.g., HiU, 184 B.R. at 755. This test "focuses on whether the debtor's budgeted expenses 
are reasonably necessary." I d. Most courts have used the disposable income test in their 
analysis of section 523(a)(15)(A). See Marris, 197 B.R. at 243 ("[M]ost courts have seen fit 
to apply [the] test to the facts presented in [the section 523(a) (15) (A)] context."). But cf. 
Humiston v. Huddelston (In re Huddelston), 194 B.R. 681, 687-88 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 
1996) (arguing that although disposable income analysis should figure into section 
523(a) (15) (A), "such a single faceted inquiry cannot encompass the totality of a court's 
consideration in applying section 523(a)(15)."). Because courts have an analogous 
Bankruptcy Code section for guidance in the section 523(a) (I5) (A) context, it seems to 
have caused less controversy, and will not be analyzed in this Note. 
108. See 11 U.S.C. § 523(a) (15); Hesson, 190 B.R. at 239; Carroll, 187 B.R. at 200. 
109. See 11 U.S.C. § 523(a) (15) (B). 
110. Phillips, 187 B.R. at 369. The court goes on to assure the reader that it is not "shy 
to fulfill its role in deciding what is 'fair'." Id. 
111. See Becker, 185 B.R. at 569 ("[T]here is no legislative history to guide the Court, 
thus, I am left with the plain language of the Code section."). 
112. See Hill, 184 B.R. at 756 ("The lack of an analogous Code provision compels the 
Court to search for its own guidelines for balancing the equities."); see also McGarity, 
supra note 8 ("The 'benefit' balancing test does not have an analogous statutory provision 
.... "). 
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test,"113 have emerged to determine dischargeability, leavingjudges adrift 
and practitioners puzzled about which standards pt:evail. 
B. Response to the New Amendments 
Practitioners andjudges recognize that the new amendments to sec-
tion 523 are groundbreaking; one commentator even claims that they 
represent part of "the most sweeping change in bankruptcy law" relating 
to domestic relations in almost 100 years.114 It seems certain that at a 
minimum, the Reform Act "codifies a new social policy."115 Certainly, the 
new amendments reflect Congress's awareness of the inadequacy in pro-
tecting only support debts from discharge. Enactment of the amend-
ments affirmed congressional commitment to the policy that "a debtor 
should not use the protection of a bankruptcy filing in order to avoid 
legitimate marital and child support obligations. "116 
Although commentators applaud the goals and purposes of the new 
legislation, most believe that Congress's strategy for interpretation and 
implementation of the statute by bankruptcy courts is, at best, opaque.n7 
Several judges and other commentators, noting that there is not even an 
analogous statutory provision to furnish guidance, have attempted to for-
mulate their own guidelines. Not surprisingly, these efforts have yielded 
a variety ofstandards.118 Other judges have relied exclusively on the Ian-
113. See, e.g., Beasley v. Adams (In re Adams), 200 B.R. 630, 635 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 
1996); Sterna v. Paneras (In re Paneras), 195 B.R. 395, 404 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1996); 
Humiston v. Huddelston (In re Huddelston), 194 B.R. 681, 689 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 1996); 
Gantz v. Gantz (In re Gantz), 192 B.R. 932, 936 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1996); Taylorv. Taylor (In 
re Taylor), 191 B.R. 760, 766 (Bankr. N.D. m. 1996); Florio v. Florio (In re Florio), 187 
B.R. 654, 658 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 1995). 
114. Bowles, supra note 57, at 3. 
115. Ellis, supra note 1, at 81 ("Under the new Act, bankruptcy courts must now 
affirmatively protect the interests of the debtor's spouse, former spouse, and children.") 
116. H.R. Rep. No. 103-835, at 54 (1994), reprinted in 1994 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3340, 3363. 
117. See, e.g., Bowles, supra note 57, at 4 ("Congress' intent was not clearly stated in 
the resulting legislation."). Bowles lists a set of questions that seem to remain unanswered 
by the amendment: "Who has the burden of proof? •... Who has standing to bring these 
actions? •... What is dischargeable or nondischargeable under this section? . . . . What 
does the term 'in the course of a divorce or separation' mean? .... How will the 
'reasonably necessary income and property' test be applied?" Id. at 4-5; see also Arthur B. 
Federman, The Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1994, 51 J. Mo. B. 105, 105 (1995) ("By its 
nature the maintenance versus property settlement issue has always been murky. Well, it 
just got murkier."). But see Anthony v. Anthony (In re Anthony), 190 B.R. 433, 435-36 
(Bankr. N.D. Ala. 1995) ("The legislative history of the section is uncharacteristically clear 
and is helpful in deciding this matter."). 
118. See, e.g., Anthony, 190 B.R. at 437 ("Factors . . . include: changes in 
circumstances from the time of the divorce or separation to the filing of the bankruptcy 
petition; the relative income and worth of the parties; employment or potential for 
employment; the nondebtor's responsibility for other debts; a comparison of the debtor's 
and nondebtor's post-bankruptcy obligations; the present financial conditions of the 
parties; and, effect on children, if there are any."); Carroll v. Carroll (In re Carroll), 187 
B.R. 197, 201 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1995) ("In light of the lack of an analogous Bankruptcy 
Code provision, ... the Court must examine factors such as the income and expenses of 
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guage of the statute without articulating any guiding considerations.119 
Observers have also expressed concern that the new provision will perpet-
uate battles fought in divorce court into subsequent bankruptcy 
proceedings.120 
Imperfect congressional efforts to resolve the problem of property 
division debts have left considerable confusion and frustration in their 
wake. A few judges have even registered their complaints in recent opin-
ions, rejecting the balancing test as too flexible to provide meaningful 
guidance. Judge DeGunther explains: 
Bankruptcy Judges are often called upon to apply a totality of 
the circumstances analysis to the interpretation of subjective 
terms. And we do it with a conscientious vigor. But have we 
ever been called upon to decide a more illusive statutory stan-
dard than the benefit of a discharge to Party A versus the detri-
mental consequences to Party B?121 
both parties, the nature of the debts, and the non-Debtor spouse's ability to pay relevant 
debts. The Court must therefore review the totality of the circumstances .... "); Hill v. Hill 
(In re Hill), 184 B.R. 750, 756 (Bankr. N.D. Dl. 1995) ("The lack of an analogous Code 
provision compels the Court to search for its own guidelines for balancing the equities. 
Factors to examine include, but are not limited to the following: the income and expenses 
of both parties; whether the nondebtor spouse is jointly liable on the debts; the number of 
dependents; the nature of the debts; the reaffirmation of any debts; and the non debtor 
spouse's ability to pay."); see also McGarity, supra note 8 ("Factors to be considered in 
balancing the benefit of the debtor's discharge against the detriment to the creditor might 
include the amount of the debtor's exempt property, the income of both parties, the 
number of dependents of each, and whether the non-debtor former spouse is also liable to 
creditors assigned to the debtor in divorce."). 
119. See, e.g., Collins v. Hesson (In re Hesson), 190 B.R. 229, 232 (Bankr. D. Md. 
1995); Phillips v. Phillips (In re Phillips), 187 B.R. 363, 368 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1995); 
Kessler v. Butler (In re Butler), 186 B.R. 371, 373 (Bankr. D. Vt. 1995); Becker v. Becker 
(In re Becker), 185 B.R. 567, 569 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 1995). 
120. For analysis of this problem in greater depth, see supra text accompanying notes 
90-91; infra note 231. 
121. Hill, 184 B.R. at 756. Judge Conrad was concerned with the nature of the new 
amendment: 
It has been said that one should never watch laws or sausage being made, and 
section 523(a) (15) of the Bankruptcy Code is no exception to that caution. 
Section (a) (15) is a pernicious creature. Using it is equivalent to applying 
acupuncture without a license because it does not heal the emotional wounds 
from a divorce. Indeed, section (a) (15) is an intrusive invasion into the private 
lives of a former couple who had agreed in their divorce to separate forever. 
Section (a) (15) can be described as an impediment to the emotional fresh start 
in life that divorce may bring. It also can impede the fresh start of bankruptcy. 
Butler, 186 B.R. at 372; see also Schmitt v. Eubanks (In re Schmitt), 197 B.R. 312, 317 
(Bankr. W.D. Ark. 1996) ("The terms of this statute require a Court weigh [sic] the benefit 
against the detriment-an odd balancing and an impossibly amorphous standard."); Gantz 
v. Gantz (In re Gantz), 192 B.R. 932, 937 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1996) ("In the year and a half 
since its effective date, Section 523(a) (15) has provided a formidable challenge to the 
interpretive skills of bankruptcy practitioners and judges."). 
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These comments, along with a review of recent cases, suggest that while 
the new section 523(a) (15) (B) is an important step toward better protec-
tion of marital debts, it is in need of further clarification. 
C. Sampling of Current Decisions 
Some have warned that "[t]he small stream of domestic relations 
cases which have been flowing through the Federal Courts under 11 
U.S.C. § 523(a) (5) now threatens to become a mighty river under 11 
U.S.C. § 523(a) (15)."122 A considerable body of case law has certainly 
accumulated since Congress enacted the amendments. This Part ana-
lyzes how bankruptcy courts have applied the new amendment to section 
523 through a review of Dressler v. Dressler (In re Dressler), 123 Bodily v. Morris 
(In re Morris),I24 and In re Smither.J25 
The purpose of exploring these cases is to discover how section 
523(a) (15) (B) is being implemented in practice. It is impossible to flesh 
out, in the span of three cases, all of the nuances and wrinkles involved in 
application of the amendment. The goal of this discussion, instead, is to 
illustrate the range of judicial interpretation and application of the stat-
ute. All of these decisions hinged on application of the balancing test, as 
opposed to the first prong of the new amendment. The first two cases 
reached results that are inconsistent with the goals of the statute; the last 
case arrived at a result that better meets those goals. Not all decisions 
resulting from the new statute are ''bad" or unjust. To the contrary, many 
decisions arrive at the "right" result.126 The larger point here is that 
courts have no definite instructions on how to apply the statute, resulting 
in a variety of approaches and leaving the case law in disarray. These 
varied approaches sometimes dictate results that do not fully realize 
Congress's purposes. 
122. In re Smither, 194 B.R 102, 112 (Bankr. W.D. Ky. 1996). 
123. 194 B.R. 290 (Bankr. D.RI. 1996). 
124. 193 B.R 949 (Bankr. S.D. Cal. 1996). 
125. 194 B.R. 102 (Bankr. W.D. Ky. 1996). 
126. In the first cases decided under the Reform Act, debtors apparently were more 
successful than creditors. See Debtors Are Early Wmners in New Discharge Battle, 
Consumer Bankr. News (BCD), Sept. 28, 1995, at 1, 4. However, among the growing 
number of cases decided since the effective date of the amendment, more debts have been 
protected rather than discharged. 
In some cases, the equitable outcome will be to discharge the debt. For an example of 
a case justifiably reaching this result, see, e.g., Taylor v. Taylor (In re Taylor), 191 B.R 760 
(Bankr. N.D. Dl. 1996). In Taylor, the creditor ex-wife's financial status was far superior to 
the debtor's, and her deposition testimony included "her candid admission that the 
detrimental consequence to her if [the debtor did] not have to repay her the subject debt 
'[would] be psychological more than anything else.'" Id. at 763. 
Because Congress's intent was to better protect marital debts from discharge, this 
Note focuses on cases where discharged debts arguably should have been protected-
decisions that are too pro-debtor. It must also be recognized, however, that some cases 
have at least arguably been too pro-creditor. See Smither, 194 B.R. at 110; see also infra note 
148 (describing critique made by Smither court). 
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1. Dressler v. Dressler. - Fredda and Michael Dressler dissolved their 
marriage of approximately t\venty years on November 19, 1993.127 The 
settlement agreement provided that Michael would pay child support and 
alimony to Fredda, who had not worked outside the home for most of the 
marriage.128 The agreement also awarded Fredda the family residence, 
for which she eventually was to assume primary financial responsibility.129 
Michael received other properties (the "Providence properties"), and was 
responsible for their associated debt; he also agreed to indemnify Fredda 
for any losses sustained because of her liability on the mortgage obliga-
tions of those properties.130 
When the settlement agreement was finalized, a loan secured by the 
Providence properties was in default.131 Although Michael was negotiat-
ing with the bank to release Fredda from personal liability on the obliga-
tion, no agreement was reached, and after the divorce the bank fore-
closed on the Providence properties and obtained a deficiency judgment 
against Fredda, also seeking to collect the deficiency against Michael.132 
Fredda eventually settled with the Trust, owing her father $52,500 plus 
interest for money loaned to her to satisfy the settlement.133 At the time 
of the discharge litigation, Fredda had sold the family residence, had ap-
proximately $150,000 in the bank, and was working as a real estate bro-
ker, with a salary of approximately $40,000.134 Michael had a 1994 in-
come of $130,170 and a 1995 salary of approximately $100,000.135 Both 
parties had remarried, and Fredda's husband had substantial assets and 
income.136 At some point during this time, Michael filed for Chapter 7 
bankruptcy. 
Michael's assumption of the Providence properties debt and mainte-
nance of insurance relating to the Providence properties were the source 
of the court's section 523(a)(15) analysis. Mter finding that the hold 
harmless/ debt assumption obligation was not excepted from discharge 
under section 523(a)(5),137 the court proceeded to examine dis-
chargeability under section 523(a) (15).138 Judge Haines found that 
Michael had sufficient income to pay his hold harmless obligation to 
127. See Dressler, 194 B.R. at 293. 
128. See id. 
129. See id. 
130. See id. 
131. See id. at 294. 
132. See id. 
133. See id. 
134. See id. at 293. 
135. See id. 
136. See id. The court did not consider Fredda's husband's assets because "her 
personal resources and earning capacity [made] it unnecessary to do so." Id. at 305 n.36. 
137. In other words, the court found that the debt was neither alimony nor support. 
See id. at 297. 
138. The court found little guidance to interpret the statute: 
Here, we leave the beaten path. Section 523 (a)(15) is relatively new and is not yet 
the subject of authoritative case law in the First Circuit or this district. Moreover, 
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Fredda, satisfying section 523(a)(15)(A).139 He then continued with ap-
plication of the section 523(a) (15) (B) balancing test. With no explicit 
articulation of the factors considered in making this determination, the 
court held that Michael's debt to her would be discharged "[b]ecause 
Fredda [had] the present ability to pay the obligation without any other 
demonstrated detrimental consequence .... "140 Fredda had "cash in 
hand" from which she could repay the money that she had borrowed 
from her father, and was capable of earning at least $40,000 a year.141 
Given these realities, she did not demonstrate "the character of detriment 
that Congress had in mind when it added§ 523(a) (15) to the Code."142 
According to the court she could "easily pay."I43 
This result distorted the amendment's goals of better protecting 
post-divorce debt obligations. Though the court found (as provided by 
the amendments) that Michael's ability to pay the debt alone did not 
protect Fredda from discharge, Fredda's ability to pay that debt, without 
regard to other factors, was sufficient to protect Michael. There was no 
"balancing'' involved in the court's determination: the court paid scant 
attention to the detrimental consequences resulting from Fredda's pay-
ment of the debt, and did not discuss at all Michael's "benefit" from the 
discharge.144 A brief look at the relative financial situations of Fredda 
and Michael at the time of trial reveals that from a strictly economic 
standpoint, the benefit of discharge would likely not outweigh the detri-
ment to Fredda.145 Judge Haines himself noted that "Fredda could 
shoulder debt even less easily than Michael" when analyzing the debt 
under section 523(a) (5).146 Furthermore, Michael filed for Chapter 7 
bankruptcy, and presumably was obtaining the financial relief that bank-
the statute is awkwardly drawn, leading the courts that have considered it to 
disparate notions of how it is to be applied. 
Id. at 299. 
139. See id. at 304. 
140. Id. at 305. 
141. See id. 
142. Id. 
143. Id. 
144. See id. The court sought to justify its result by characterizing the debt as one 
that Fredda could "easily pay," situating her in one of the few examples provided by the 
legislative history. See H.R Rep. No. 103-835, at 54 (1994), reprinted in 1994 
U.S.C.CA.N. 3340, 3363 ("[I]f a non debtor spouse would suffer little detriment from the 
debtor's nonpayment of an obligation required to be paid under a hold harmless 
agreement (perhaps because it could not be collected from the nondebtor spouse or 
because the nondebtor spouse could easily pay it) the obligation would be discharged."). 
To the contrary, this was not a debt Fredda could easily pay. Such an assumption is not 
supported, given the relative financial realities of the two parties, along with the 
motivations and rationales of the settlement agreement. 
145. See supra text accompanying notes 134-136. "Michael maintains a six-figure 
income with valuable perquisites. He lives with his new wife and their young child in an 
expensive home and drives a new car. He enjoys membership in a country club and a 
health club. His lifestyle is, to say the least, comfortable." Dressler, 194 B.R at 304. 
146. Id. at 298. 
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ruptcy affords.147 Finally, given that both parties had the wherewithal to 
pay the debt in question (although Michael was arguably better situated 
in this regard), 148 the court did not consider the underlying rationale of 
the settlement agreement: from what can be gleaned of the couple's his-
tory, Fredda was not employed for most of the couple's twenty-year mar-
riage, and began to work full-time just before the divorce.l49 The settle-
ment provisions were most likely intended to reflect these realities, 
including her earning potential.150 Had the court applied a thoughtful 
and nuanced balancing of the detriments and benefits as demanded by 
the statute, it seems unlikely that the debt in question would have been 
discharged.151 
2. Bodily v. Morris. - Elizabeth and James Morris dissolved their 
marriage on November 16, 1994.152 In the dissolution judgment, no 
spousal support was ordered because Elizabeth's income was slightly 
147. See infra text accompanying note 219. 
148. The parties in Anthony v. Anthony (In re Anthony), were in a financial position 
similar to the Dresslers: there was an "equality of circumstances" in that both parties had 
the ability to pay the debt in question. 190 B.R 433, 440 (Bankr. N.D. Ala. 1995). In that 
case, the court held that the debtor (Michael), who made $500 more on a monthly basis 
than his former spouse, failed to meet his burden of proof concerning dischargeability of 
the property division debt under section 523(a) (15) (B). See id. This case has been 
criticized, however, because the court made this finding notwithstanding the fact that his 
former spouse had inherited $71,000 since the divorce, and the debtor did not own a car 
and was living with his mother at the time of trial. See In re Smither, 194 B.R 102, 110 
(Bankr. W.D. Ky. 1996) ("The language in Anthony and Florio ignores the value of the 
Debtor's discharge and simply blends [section 523(a)(15)(B)] into an inseparable mass 
·with [section 523(a) (15) (A)] by making the existence of 'excess income' the determinative 
test of 523(a) (15) (B)."). 
149. See Dressler, 194 B.R at 293. 
150. See supra text accompanying notes 63-73 (describing how women in Fredda's 
position are often harmed by divorce and bankruptcy more than their ex-spouses). 
151. For another example ofless-than-rigorous application of the balancing test that 
arguably achieved an unjust result, albeit in dicta, see, e.g., Woodworth v. Woodworth (In 
re Woodworth), 187 B.R 174 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1995). In Woodwrmh, the court found 
that the debtor was unable to pay under the first prong of section 523(a) (15). See id. at 
177. Because the case was one of first impression, the court proceeded to analyze 
discharge under section 523(a)(15)(B). See id. Placing the burden of proof on the 
creditor, the court found that the benefit to the debtor outweighed the detriment to the 
creditor. See id. Judge Baxter made this finding notwithstanding several troubling facts. 
The debtor, although temporarily employed after losing his job, was living at home and 
appeared to have substantial job skills. He also spent a lump sum award from his 401-K 
settlement plan on buying a car for his girlfriend and other expenses, rather than paying 
off some of his scheduled debt. See id. at 176. The debtor's ex-wife also had to leave her 
previous jobs. Unlike the debtor, however, she was diagnosed as permanently and partially 
disabled with carpel tunnel syndrome, leaving her unable to capitalize on previously 
acquired job skills. See id. Also unlike the debtor, she lived alone, was self:.employed, and 
her ability to make a profit was speculative at the time of trial. See id. Without articulating 
which factors it had considered, the court fo~nd that they did not weigh clearly in favor of 
either party, and that therefore the balancing test would have favored dischargeability. See 
id. at 178. 
152. See Bodily v. Morris (In re Morris), 193 B.R 949, 951 (Bankr. S.D. Cal. 1996). 
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greater than James's, but James was required to pay child support and to 
assume responsibility for one-half of two unsecured debts.153 The court 
ordered James to make an equalization payment to Elizabeth of 
$8542.68.154 
James filed for Chapter 7 bankruptcy on January 13, 1995.155 At that 
time he claimed a combined net monthly income of $2612.26 and total 
monthly expenses of $3028.156 At the bankruptcy proceeding to deter-
mine dischargeability, Elizabeth testified that she owed over $37,000 in 
credit card debt and $41,000 in student loan debts that matured in 
October and November of 1995.157 Elizabeth "steadfastly assert[ed] that 
she [would] not be filing Chapter 7 bankruptcy herself," but the court 
found that her net montqly income of $3600 did not "realistically appear 
to be sufficient to pay debts of this magnitude."15S 
James's responsibility for the equalization payment was the subject of 
the discharge dispute. When the trial concluded, the court found that 
although james was able to pay seventy-five dollars each month in fulfill-
ment of the equalization debt under section 523(a)(15)(A), the detri-
ment to him outweighed the benefit to Elizabeth, "who would still be 
hopelessly in debt."159 Applying a "totality of the circumstances" test, the 
court considered the income and expenses of both parties, whether the 
nondebtor spouse was jointly liable on the debts, the number of depen-
dents, the nature of the debts, and the non debtor's ability to pay.16° Two 
especially significant factors in the court's balancing determination were 
James's "tight budget" and the possibility that the seventy-five dollar pay-
ment each month might jeopardize or harm the relationship he had with 
his children.161 These factors, coupled with Elizabeth's own debt, coun-
seled in favor of discharge.162 The court opined that "[p]articularly, 
where the nondebtor spouse is hopelessly in debt, the best solution is for 
both spouses to file bankruptcy."163 Elizabeth admitted at trial that she 
had a monthly deficit of $461.29, not including certain necessities and 
the matured student loan debts; she could not, according to the court, 
153. See id. 
154. See id. The equalization payment was intended to equalize allocation of 
responsibility for the payment of debts and the division of property between Elizabeth and 
James. See id. at 950. 
155. See id. at 951. 
156. See id. James later admitted that some expense items listed had been overstated, 
but that other expenses (income taxes, rent, and child support arrearages to the mothers 
of his two other minor children) had not been disclosed. See id. 
157. See id. 
158. Id. 
159. Id. 
160. See id. at 954 n.8 (citation omitted). 
161. See id. at 954. 
162. See id. 
163. Id. (citing Woodworth v. Woodworth (In re Woodworth), 187 B.R 174, 176-78 
(Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1995); Hill v. Hill (In re Hill), 184 B.R 750, 756 (Bankr. N.D. III. 
1995)). 
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pay her debts even when receiving the monthly equalization payment.164 
Thus, the court suggested that Elizabeth was "better off filing bankruptcy 
to deal ·with her debts."165 
This decision is part of an alarming trend in some bankruptcy courts 
to discharge marital debts even when that result may increase the likeli-
hood that the creditor will file for bankruptcy herself.I66 While the 
Morris court did grasp the statutory imperative to effect a balancing test, 
its execution of that test was perfunctory. Neither the benefit to the 
debtor nor the detriment to the creditor was explored in much detail. 
The apparent benefits to James were the alleviation, to some degree, of 
his "tight budget" and enabling him to spend more time and money with 
his other two children.167 On the other side of the balance was possible 
bankruptcy for Elizabeth. The court carefully pointed out the extent to 
which discharge would not really help her, since she (in the court's opin-
ion) could not pay her debts; However, the court underestimated the 
extent to which discharge would work to Elizabeth's detriment, suggesting 
dismissively that she file for bankruptcy herself.16B The court did not ap-
pear to consider the effects that loss of the equalization payment might 
have on her relationship with her child, nor did it consider the psycholog-
ical and other costs associated with bankruptcy filing. 
164. See id. at 954. 
165. Id. Although filing for bankruptcy could have placed Elizabeth in a position 
where the creditors could not collect the debt, see supra note 144, the statute and 
legislative history should not be construed as advocating bankruptcy filing for creditor ex-
spouses. See infra notes 166-172, 236-237, and accompanying text. 
166. Willey v. Willey (In re Willey}, 198 B.R. 1007, 1016 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1996); Hill, 
184 B.R. at 756: and Woodworlh, 187 B.R. at 176, are three other cases where the courts 
would have discharged marital debts although such action meant that the creditor would 
likely have to file for bankruptcy herself. However, in those three cases, the debtors were 
unable to pay the debts under section 523(a) (15) (A). Morris is even more egregious: not 
only would Elizabeth most likely have to file for bankruptcy, but James was capable of 
paying the debt at issue. Moreover, here the court purposefully and paternalistically 
attempted to impose bankruptcy upon the creditor against that creditor's better judgment 
and express intentions. See supra text accompanying note 158; see also Craig v. Craig (In 
re Craig}, 196 B.R. 305, 309 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 1996) ("Though the court is sympathetic to 
the fact that plaintiff was forced into bankruptcy by debtor's failure to live up to his 
obligations, several courts have s11ggested that, under the circumstances, bankruptcy is the 
best remedy available to the nondebtor spouse."); In re Smither, 194 B.R. 102, 111 (Bankr. 
W.D. Ky. 1996) (creditor's eligibility for bankruptcy considered a factor}; Collins v. Hesson 
(In re Hesson), 190 B.R. 229, 240 (Bankr. D. Md. 1995} (court noted that non debtor could 
file for bankruptcy relief as partial basis for decision); Silvers v. Silvers (In re Silvers), 187 
B.R. 648, 650 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 1995) ("[T]he only redeeming factor here is that now .•. 
the former spouse can discharge these obligations the same way the debtor did."). 
For the opposite conclusion, see Schmitt v. Eubanks (In re Schmitt), 197 B.R. 312, 317 
(Bankr. W.D. Ark. 1996} (rejecting "any notion that the nondebtor should resolve his 
situation by filing bankruptcy himself"). 
167. See Morris, 193 B.R. at 954. 
168. See id. 
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Finally, the court disregarded Elizabeth's stated intention not to file 
Chapter 7 bankruptcy herself. 169 Judge Adler's ruling encouraged bank-
ruptcy filing both overtly, by suggesting that Elizabeth was "better off" 
filing for bankruptcy,170 and covertly, as discharging James's debt to 
Elizabeth deprived her of one source of income that could have helped 
her avoid bankruptcy. Furthermore, Judge Adler's determination that 
Elizabeth should file was no guarantee that she would, especially given 
her explicit testimony. If Elizabeth had filed for bankruptcy prior to the 
discharge proceeding, such filing might have suggested little economic 
detriment in discharge. Absent such filing, however, discharge of marital 
debt should not be permitted to hasten bankruptcy for the creditor. In 
the event that Elizabeth did not file, the detriment could be vast, as she 
would struggle to keep afloat, cutting both discretionary and non-discre-
tionary spending, and falling further into debt. Possible bankruptcy 
should be considered "substantial detriment" to the nondebtor outweigh-
ing the debtor's need for a fresh start,171 especially when the debtor has 
the ability to pay the debt in question, and the nondebtor does not.172 
3. In re Smither.-Joan and Victor Smither divorced in 1993 after a 
twenty-year marriage.173 During the marriage, Joan stayed at home to 
care for their children, and later decided to forego employment opportu-
nities in order to further Victor's career.174 The divorce judgment 
awarded Joan custody of the children and the marital residence, equally 
divided the marital estate, and divided other property, debts, and assets 
between the two parties.175 The court ordered Victor to pay Joan $2994 
"in order to equalize the amount of assets awarded to each party," and to 
pay her attorneys' fees.176 
169. See supra text accompanying note 158. 
170. See supra text accompanying note 165. 
171. See Schmitt, 197 B.R at 317 (implication that nondebtor would have to file for 
bankruptcy militates in nondebtor's favor). 
172. For a case where the court considered possible bankruptcy filing by the creditor 
to mitigate in her favor, see Slover v. Slover (In re Slover}, 191 B.R 886 (Bankr. E.D. Okla. 
1996). In Slover, the court found that the debtor would have the ability to pay the debt. 
Turning to the balancing test, the court stated: 
Should harsh collection efforts be made ... to collect [the debt], [the creditor] 
will in all probability be a prime candidate for Bankruptcy Code relief. She has 
been saddled with most of the debts of the marriage. When considering all the 
circumstances and fairness to the parties, the Court finds that, by a 
preponderance of the evidence, the detriment to the nondebtor spouse in this 
case outweighs the benefit of discharging the debt. Thus, this Court finds that 
the debt to [the creditor] is nondischargeable. 
Id. at 893. 
173. See In re Smither, 194 B.R 102, 112 (Bankr. W.D. Ky. 1996). 
174. See id. at 113. By making such sacrifices, Joan forfeited both career 
development and other financial oportunities that likely would have been beneficial 
following divorce. 
175. See id. at 118. 
176. Id. 
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Soon after their "bitter and hotly contested divorce," Victor filed for 
bankruptcy in December 1994.177 At the time of the filing, the parties' 
circumstances had changed considerably. Both had remarried. Victor 
was earning $71,175.92 annually, along with a manager incentive bonus 
of $12,060. His net monthly pay was $3400.178 In his bankruptcy petition 
schedule, Victor listed expenses of $4289.70 each month, including mort-
gage payments on a house owned by his new wife and alimony he was no 
longer required to pay, but not including $1500 each month for Joan's 
state court attorneys' fees.179 After the divorce, joan left her job, where 
she earned approximately $23,000 annually, and returned to college.180 
She and her new husband reported a combined income of between 
$40,000 and $50,000, excluding the child support she was receiving from 
Victor.181 Their monthly expenses were $3939.48, not including tithing 
to her church and additional charitable contributions.I82 
After consideration of the genesis and purposes of the Reform 
Act, 183 along with unresolved issues and differences in interpretation, 184 
the court proceeded to analyze the dischargeability of the $2994 equaliza-
tion payment under sections 523(a)(15)(A) and (B). The court inter-
preted the language of the statute as clearly mandating that 
a court ... compare the standard of living of the debtor against 
the standard(s) of living of his or her spouse, former spouse, 
and/ or children to determine whether the debtor will "suffer 
more" by not receiving a discharge of the debts in question than 
his or her spouse would suffer if the obligations were 
discharged.185 
After reviewing vastly different interpretations of the balancing test, some 
of which seemed too biased in favor of either debtors or creditors, the 
court offered its own formulation of the best way to apply the balancing 
test: 
[The court must] review the financial status of the debtor and 
the creditor and compare their relative standards of living to 
determine the true benefit of the debtor's possible discharge 
against any hardship the spouse, former spouse and/ or children 
would suffer as a result of the debtor's discharge. If, after mak-
ing this analysis, the debtor's standard of living will be greater 
than or approximately equal to the creditor's if the debt is not 
177. Id. at 104. 
178. See id. at 104-05. Victor and his new wife had a combined income of$122,692, 
but her income was not introduced at trial. See id. 
179. See id. at 105. 
180. See id. 
181. See id. 
182. See id. 
183. See id. The court also described the new statute as "a paving stone on the road 
to the region of Hades reserved for litigation nightmares." Id. at 106. 
184. For discussion of unresolved issues and splits of authority in this area, see infra 
notes 204-208 and accompanying text 
185. Smither, 194 B.R. at 110. 
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discharged, then the debt should be nondischargeable under 
the 523(a) (15) (B) test. However, if the debtor's standard of liv-
ing will fall materially below the creditor's standard of living if 
the debt is not discharged, then the debt should be discharged 
186 
121 
Judge Dickenson then articulated eleven factors that courts should con-
sider (as a minimum) when applying the balancing test.187 Considering 
the factors, the court concluded that both Joan and Victor had adequate 
resources to absorb the debt. Victor would not be driven to a significantly 
lower standard of living if the debt were not discharged; but neither 
would Joan especially suffer if the debt were discharged.188 Finding that 
the two parties' standards of living were approximately equal regardless 
of discharge, the court held that Victor had failed to show that his benefit 
from discharge outweighed the detriment to Joan that would have accom-
panied discharge.189 
Situated between extreme interpretations unduly favoring either 
debtors or creditors, Judge Dickenson's standard of living approach es-
tablished a tenable middle ground, although ideally the factors consid-
ered would be more narrow in scope. By cabining the myriad factors 
constituting a "totality of the circumstances" in terms of the parties' rela-
tive standards of living, Judge Dickenson made the test manageable. 
Standards of living are substantially quantifiable and are accurate barom-
eters for evaluating the benefits and detriments of discharge. Further-
more, his considerations include implicit presumptions that favor credi-
tor ex-spouses in two areas, thus according proper deference to divorce 
settlements and respect for the congressional goal of better protecting 
marital obligations. First, the debt would not be discharged if the 
debtor's standard of living is greater than or equal to the creditor's; how-
ever, the debt would be dischargeable only if the debtor's standard of 
living falls materiaUy below the creditor's. Second, the court considered as 
one of its factors the good faith of both parties. This is especially impor-
186. Id. at 11 I. 
187. See id. The factors discussed were: (1) the amount of debt involved; (2) the 
current income of the debtor, creditor, and their respective spouses; (3) their current 
expenses; ( 4) current assets; (5) current liabilities; (6) their health, job skills, training, age 
and education; (7) dependents, along with ages and any special needs; (8) any changes in 
financial conditions; (9) the amount of other debt which has or will be discharged in the 
debtor's bankruptcy; (10) whether the objecting creditor is eligible for relief under the 
Bankruptcy Code; and (11) whether the parties have acted in good faith in the filing of 
bankruptcy and the litigation. See id. The court also felt that it was important to consider 
a voluntary reduction of income by the debtor or creditor, for example, sacrifice of income 
in order to pursue education and career goals. See id. 
188. See id. at 111. 
189. See id. at 112. The court cited Florio v. Florio (In re Florio), 187 B.R 654, 657 
(Bankr. W.D. Mo. 1995) for the proposition that when "there is equal harm or lack of 
harm, a debt is nondischargeable" tmder the balancing test. See Smither, 194 B.R at 112. 
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tant given the abuse of bankruptcy by ex-spouses, and congressional in-
tent to eliminate such abuse through the new amendments.19° 
4. Conclusions. - Congress did not eradicate all problems when it 
amended the discharge provisions of the Bankruptcy Code by adding sec-
tion 523(a) (15). Several problems remain. First, the flexibility of the bal-
ancing test, which has no guidelines or standards, 191 leads to a lack of 
uniformity and consistency192 in application of the test that can translate 
into a high degree of subjectivity. Consequently, litigants and practition-
ers lack known boundaries wh~n preparing their cases. One important 
justification for giving bankruptcy courts jurisdiction in domestic rela-
tions cases is promotion of uniform operation of law and a reduction in 
forum shopping and uncertainty for litigants.193 Under the laconic com-
mand of section 523(a)(15)(B), however, courts determining the dis-
chargeability of a marital debt have, unsurprisingly, developed a variety of 
approaches.194 This lack of coherence thwarts uniform application of the 
law. Uniform application can be further frustrated by the methods courts 
employ in considering the rele~t "factors." The factors that courts 
enunciate may not be exhaustive of all factors they consider,195 and as in 
the context of section 523(a)(5),196 the courts have not evaluated the 
relative importance of the factors. As has also been the case with section 
523(a)(5), the lack of unity in the factors informing the section 
523(a) (15) (B) inquiry, along with the "wide discretion courts possess to 
create ad hoc hierarchies of importance, strongly contravenes the notion 
that the federal courts are applying the law uniformly or that there is one 
federal standard."197 This indeterminacy suggests that the test might be 
more manageable if couched in more quantifiable and less elusive terms. 
A second problem is the manner in which some courts balance the 
competing interests of debtors and creditors. In the Dressler case,198 the 
court did not appear to balance the competing interests at all; in 
190. See supra text accompanying notes 46-51, 55-56. 
191. See supra notes 111-113 and accompanying text. 
192. Inconsistent rulings among courts in this area were a problem even before the 
passage of the new amendments. See Alexander, supra note 27, at 374. 
193. See id. at 382. 
194. As the court in Smither noted, some courts seem to ignore any value of discharge 
to the debtor, and "blend[] [section 523(a)(15)(B)] into an inseparable mass with 
[section 523(a} (15) (A)] by making the existence of 'excess income' the determinative test 
of523(a)(15)(B)." Smither, 194 B.R. at 110. But other courts are too pro-debtor when they 
disregard the balancing test "in favor of a narrow focus on the nature of the creditor's 
detriment." Id. at 111; see also supra note 144 and accompanying text. 
195. See, e.g., Hill v. Hill (In re Hill}, 184 B.R. 750, 756 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1995) 
(factors to consider in application of section 523(a) (15) (B) "include, but are not limited to" a 
certain set (emphasis added)). 
196. See Bangert v. McCauley (In re McCauley}, 105 B.R. 315, 319 (E.D. Va. 1989) 
(assigning no specific weight to factors and holding that determination was in discretion of 
trier of fact). 
197. Alexander, supra note 27, at 385. 
198. See supra Part II.C.l. 
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Morris, 199 the court performed the balancing test only superficially. With-
out a true balancing of the competing equities, accurate and just determi-
nations are simply not possible. It certainly is not difficult to find for the 
plaintiff or defendant in a given case when considering only one side of 
the equation. 
Some recent cases also evince a failure to consider much of the un-
derlying rationale behind property division settlements, which might 
have an effect on discharge, especially when the parties are similarly situ-
ated in their ability or inability to pay the debt in question. As noted 
above, divorce settlements can be critical support, and property settle-
ments are often substituted for alimony as a means of financial survival 
for ex-spouses,200 typically women. Furthermore, federal courts are alter-
ing economic arrangements of the more expert family courts, who have 
made careful determinations as to how property should be divided. 201 
Subsequent to divorce, the allocation of property and financial resources 
has already been determined, either by the state court or the parties 
themselves. 202 
In addition, some decisions tend to uphold discharge notwithstand-
ing a very real threat that the creditor will have to file for bankruptcy.203 
The courts in these cases disregard the considerable detriment that 
would result should the creditor ex-spouses be required to file for bank-
ruptcy, and consider such a possibility as mitigating in favor of the debtor 
rather than the creditor. Though such a change in circumstances cannot 
always be averted, courts should avoid allowing discharge of marital debt 
to increase the likelihood of bankruptcy for the creditor. 
Finally, a review of the cases to date reveals numerous splits of au-
thority, including burden of proof issues,204 the appropriate point in 
time to assess the parties' respective financial situations,205 whether 
courts should consider the parties' new spouses' incomes in the 
199. See supra Part ll.C.2. 
200. See supra note 46 and accompanying text; see supra Part I.C.2. 
201. Cf. supra text accompanying notes 92-97 (discussing bankruptcy courts' lesser 
capacity to effectively adjudicate domestic relations cases). 
202. See supra notes 29-33 and accompanying text. 
203. See supra note 166 and accompanying text. 
204. See supra note 106. 
205. See supra note 104. 
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calculus,206 and whether debts may be partially discharged,207 causing 
some judges to clamor for legislative remediation. 208 In light of the ensu· 
ing confusion and frustration caused by the new section, a finite set of 
specific considerations would simplify the courts' role, save time, and bet· 
ter implement congressional intent. 
Ill. PROPOSALS FOR .APPLYING SECTION 523(A) (15) (B) 
Although section 523(a) (15) provides creditor ex-spouses greater 
protection than the old Bankruptcy Code, practical judging problems 
continue to plague the bankruptcy bench. In creating the balancing test 
of section 523(a) (15) (B), Congress did not alleviate all of the problems 
that are both endemic to section 523(a) (5) determinations and surfacing 
206. Many cases impute current spouses' income in their determinations. See, e.g., 
Beasley v. Adams (In re Adams), 200 B.R 630, 634 (Bankr. N.D. Dl. 1996) (following 
recent opinions that "courts cannot possibly determine exactly how much of a debtor's 
own income is truly 'necessary' for his and his dependent's [sic] support without inquiring 
whether or not, and how much, his new spouse is contributing to the family's 
maintenance"); Cleveland v. Cleveland (In re Cleveland), 198 B.R 394, 398 (Bankr. N.D. 
Ga. 1996) (considering income of new spouse or spousal equivalent in applying section 
523(a) (15) (A)); Celani v. Celani (In re Celani), 194 B.R 719, 721 (Bankr. D. Conn. 1996) 
("Where the debtor and/or the debtor's former spouse have remarried, the financial 
. circumstances of the new spouses logically and sensibly should be included in the 
balancing test ••.. "); Gantz v. Gantz (In re Gantz), 192 B.R 932, 936-37 (Bankr. N.D. Dl. 
1996) (refusing to consider current spouse's income for section 523(a) (15) (A), but using 
it for section 523(a)(15)(B)); In re Smither, 194 B.R 102, 108 (Bankr. W.D. Ky. 1996) 
("[W]here a debtor has remarried prior to the trial ... his or her spouse's income should 
be included in the calculation of the debtor's disposable income."); Hill v. Hill (In re Hill), 
184 B.R 750, 755 (Bankr. N.D. Dl. 1995) (exploring impact of new spouse's income upon 
debtor's ability to pay); Comisky v. Comisky (In re Comisky), 183 B.R 883, 883-84 (Bankr. 
N.D. Cal. 1995) (using new spouse's income in analysis). 
Other courts do not consider such income. See, e.g., Carter v. Carter (In re Carter), 
189 B.R 52 I, 522 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1995) (refusing to impute income of new spouse, since 
"[t]he language of 523(a)(15)(A) restricts the determination of the ability to pay solely to 
the income of the debtor"); see also Willey v. Willey (In re Willey), 198 B.R 1007, 1015 
(Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1996) ("[N]o case law has ever imputed or considered the income of a 
debtor's girlfriend, and this Court will not consider same, as it could lead to a chilling effect 
on the courtship and re-marriage of divorced partners." (emphasis added)). 
207. One of the early section 523(a)(15) cases allowed partial discharge. See, e.g., 
Comisky, I83 B.R at 884. Some other courts have followed suit. See, e.g., McGinnis v. 
McGinnis (In re McGinnis), 194 B.R 917, 920 (Bankr. N.D. Ala. 1996); Humiston v. 
Huddelston (In re Huddelston), 194 B.R 681, 689 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 1996); Smither, 194 
B.R at 109. Other cases have held that the statute demands an all or nothing approach. 
See, e.g., Taylor v. Taylor (In re Taylor), 191 B.R 760, 766 (Bankr. N.D.lll. 1996); Silvers v. 
Silvers (In re Silvers), 187 B.R 648, 649 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 1995); HiU, I84 B.R at 755 n.15 
(refusing to resolve controversy but indicating assent to "all or nothing" approach). 
208. See, e.g., Gantz, 192 B.R at 937 ("The Court agrees with those cases urging 
Congress to enact legislative remediation."); Taylm, 191 B.R at 766 ("The morass of 
§ 523(a) (15) is difficult ... to judicially navigate, and Congress needs to provide much 
needed legislative remediation."); Collins v. Florez (In re Florez), 191 B.R 112, 116 
(Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1995) ("Section 523(a) (15) should be the subject of critical review by the 
Bankruptcy Review Commission"). 
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in section 523(a) (15) (B) deliberations, as discussed in Parts I and II 
above. These problems are inimical to fair and efficient bankruptcy 
adjudication. 
The implementation of guidelines for the new statute is possible, and 
the ideal time for their proposal is at hand. When Congress passed the 
Reform Act, it created the National Bankruptcy Review Commission. 209 
The duties of the Commission are to investigate and study issues and 
problems relating to the Bankruptcy Code, to evaluate the advisability of 
proposals and current arrangements, and to solicit divergent views of par-
ties concerned with the bankruptcy system. 210 During its investigations, 
the Commission may hold hearings and meetings and collect official 
data.211 The end result of the Commission's efforts will be a report212 
submitted to Congress, the Chief Justice, and the President by ·october 
20, 1997.213 This report will be non-binding, but will make recommenda-
tions aimed at legislative change.214 The Commission's tenure will end 
thirty days after the report is submitted.215 
This Note proposes a set of guidelines to clarify section 
523(a)(15)(B). These guidelines should be concise and finite-some-
thing that judges can apply·without unreasonable exertion and with maxi-
mum efficiency, determinacy, and accuracy. These standards would pro-
vide for uniform application of the law, thus curtailing the current 
problems of opacity, lack of uniformity, and subjectivity. Through uni-
form guidelines, judicial economy would be conserved, and practitioners 
and litigants would have a concrete guide for section 523(a) (15) (B) pro-
ceedings. The balancing test should not be applied with mathematical 
indifference, for the domestic relations context does not admit of such 
treatment.216 What is important is to set out clear, easy to apply, uniform 
standards that allow judges to use limited discretion when necessary with-
out exhausting too much time, expending scarce judicial resources, or 
depleting the litigants' funds. 
At the outset, courts must be wary of any analysis of this section that 
is overly simplistic or pat. The balancing test demands true balancing of 
the interests of both parties. Anything less than the most conscientious 
209. See 11 U.S.C. ch. 1 note (1994) (National Bankruptcy Review Commission). 
210. See 11 U.S.C. ch. 1 note. At least one court has urged that the Commission 
review section 523(a) (15). See Florez, 191 B.R. at 116 ("The Court concludes that Section 
523(a) {15) should be the subject of critical review by the Bankruptcy Review 
Commission."). 
211. See 11 U.S.C. ch. 1 note. 
212. See 11 U.S.C. ch. 1 note. 
213. Telephone Interview with Melissa Jacobi, Staff Attorney, National Bankruptcy 
Review Commission (Sept. 20, 1996). 
214. Id. 
215. See 11 U.S.C. ch. 1 note. 
216. Proceedings between former husbands and wives presumably are more sensitive 
than those in the commercial context. 
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consideration of both sides of the balance likely will result in unjust 
outcomes. 
A. Appropriate Date for Measurement of Income and Positions of the Parties 
The circumstances at the time of the adversary proceeding rather 
than the time of filing or time of divorce are the proper context for mea-
surement of the parties' relative positions.217 Under the statute, the debt 
will be discharged if the benefit to the debtor of discharging it will out-
weigh the harm to the creditor.218 This test does not look to the past, but 
to the present and the future. Considering the most present circum-
stances may prevent unwarranted discharges that might otherwise occur 
in the context of the initial filing of the complaint. The more time that 
has elapsed since the debtor filed and the complaint was made, the more 
likely it is that the debtor's financial situation will have improved as a 
result of the bankruptcy process. Discharge of other debts may reduce 
pressure on his income. His capacity to support his family, therefore, 
may be enhanced, lessening his need for discharge and strengthening the 
creditor ex-spouse's case for maintaining debts as nondischargeable.219 
Additionally, courts should examine, to a limited degree, the future 
circumstances of the parties. This further enables courts to assess "the 
benefits of the 'fresh start' to the debtor," (and the discharge of other 
debts that may make discharge of marital obligations unnecessary) in the 
case of "any change in circumstances in employment, and other good or 
bad fortUne which may have befallen the parties."220 This approach is 
also preferable because a bankruptcy court "has no ability to revisit a 
debtor's financial circumstances after the conclusion of the trial on the 
[section] 523(a) (15) issues."221 Thus, an inquiry into the circumstances 
of the parties must allow courts to consider prospective circumstances.222 
For example, it is important to contemplate potential as well as actual 
employment. Though the debtor may take time to recover from the cir-
cumstances that caused bankruptcy, courts should not assume that he will 
remain unemployed or even that a present job will necessarily be perma-
nent. Attention to employment and potential employment will also aid 
women who have not worked outside the home and are entering the job 
market for the first time with little or no marketable skills.223 
217. Courts have disagreed about when to make this measurement. See supra note 
104. 
218. See 11 U.S.C. § 523(a) (15) (B) (1994). 
219. See Scheible, supra note 34, at 619. 
220. Schmitt v. Eubanks (In re Schmitt), 197 B.R 312, 316 (Bankr. W.D. Ark. 1996). 
221. In re _Smither, 194 B.R 102, 107-108 (Bankr. W.D. Ky. 1996). 
222. Cf. id. at 107 ("[T]his inquiry must allow a court to consider the debtor's 
prospective earning ability."). 
223. See supra note 65 and accompanying text. This examination must be carefully 
cabined, however, in order to contain discretion. Rather than speculate as to actual dollar 
amounts, courts should instead consider such factors as job skills, potential interviews, and 
other findings clearly established by the parties. 
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B. Evidence of Bad Faith Filing 
Another important factor in the application of the balancing test 
should be the parties' good faith.224 The "Bankruptcy Code ... autho-
rizes bankruptcy courts to prevent the use of the bankruptcy process to 
achieve illicit objectives. The right of debtors to a fresh start depends 
upon the honest and forthright invocation of the Code's protections."225 
A threshold question in every proceeding under section 523(a) (15) (B), 
therefore, should be whether the debtor filed for bankruptcy in good 
faith, or was seeking refuge in bankruptcy from paying marital debts. Be-
cause Congress believed that debtors should not avoid legitimate marital 
obligations by using a bankruptcy filing as protection,226 the balance 
should tip presumptively in favor of the creditor ex-spouse whenever bad 
faith is shown.227 
A creditor should be able to offer evidence that the debtor in ques-
tion filed for bankruptcy solely to avoid paying marital debts and not be-
cause of other legitimate financial hardship.22s The evidence should be 
limited, however, to a determination of whether filing for bankruptcy was 
truly a necessity in the debtor's case, and other specific bad faith evidence 
related to that bankruptcy proceeding. This means limiting the inquiry 
to an accurate assessment of debts, and the economic necessity of bank-
ruptcy: was the debtor truly insolvent? Allowing more extensive evi-
dence, such as the propensity of the party to commit this kind of fraud, or 
more general bad faith evidence (e.g., the husband has a vindictive na-
ture) would mire the court in personal battles reminiscent of "he-said-
she-said" divorce proceedings.229 As two commentators have noted, 
"[t]he net result of the section should be to prevent the use of bank-
ruptcy simply to evade marital property settlement obligations when the 
debtor does not have bona fide financial problems."230 The debtor 
224. For an example of a case that factored good faith into the balancing equation, 
see, e.g., Smither, 194 B.R. at 111 (good faith one of enumerated factors). 
225. Kestell v. Kesten (In re Kestell), 99 F.3d 146, 149 (4th Cir. 1996). 
226. See H.R. Rep. No. 103-835, at 54 (1994), reprinted in 1994 U.S.C.CAN. 3340, 
3363. 
227. This guideline finds support in the Bankruptcy Code: 
Congress has made it clear within the Bankruptcy Code itself that misuse of the 
bankruptcy process should not be countenanced. Specific provisions throughout 
the code provide remedies for abuses in each of the types of bankruptcy 
proceedings. In some code provisions, enumerated circumstances of abuse are 
addressed. In others, general phrases such as "for cause" provide broad coverage 
for unenumerated instances of misuse. 
Kestell, 99 F.3d at 148. 
228. "In view of the Congressional mandate that property settlement obligations 
should not be discharged, a debtor should not be allowed to manipulate his/her financial 
condition to the detriment of a former spouse." Gamble v. Gamble (In re Gamble), 196 
B.R. 54, 58 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 1996) (citing Florio v. Florio (In re Florio), 187 B.R. 654, 657 
(Bankr. W.D. Mo. 1995)). 
229. See supra text accompanying notes 90-91. 
230. Scott & Woodyard, supra note 53, at *340. 
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should not be allowed to discharge relevant debts if he has fraudulently 
filed for bankruptcy. 231 
C. Economic Status 
In order to reduce the extent to which bankruptcy courts must con-
sider matters more properly left to divorce courts and lessen the need for 
relitigation of domestic relations issues, judicial inquiry into the circum-
stances of the parties should be limited, to the extent possible, to their 
economic circumstances. Limiting the inquiry to quantifiable economic 
issues whenever possible reduces the role of subjectivity and bias in judi-
cial determinations of dischargeability. 
Among the economic factors courts should consider to ascertain who 
is best able to shoulder the debt are the current income, expenses, assets 
and liabilities of the parties. 232 Courts should also consider the non-
debtor's responsibility for other marital debts and whether the non-
debtor spouse is jointly liable for any of the debts. 233 The debtor's reaffir-
mation of any debts234 and the extent of the debtor's exempt property 
231. Bad faith may be difficult to prove, and may often go to issues similar to those in 
section 727 cases, which examine whether the debtor made false oaths or admissions 
related to his business transactions or discovery of his assets. When such fraud is shown, 
the Chapter 7 debtor is denied discharge. See 11 U.S.C. § 727 (1994); see, e.g., Messing v. 
Urban (In re Urban), 130 B.R. 340, 344-45 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1991); Listerv. Gonzalez (In 
re Gonzalez), 92 B.R. 960, 962 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1988). Evidence may be anecdotal, as in 
the case of the wife's testimony in Chalkleyv. Carroll (In re Chalkley), No. 93-17198, 1995 
WL 242314 (9th Cir. 1995). In Chalkley, the ex-wife testified that "[w]ell, I'd lived through 
his first bankruptcy and his first ex-wife, and he wanted-that was a good way to get rid of 
her through bankruptcy." An opportunity should be provided for creditor ex-spouses to 
make such showings. 
232. Many of these factors are taken from various pronouncements of considerations 
suggested by courts listed at supra note !18. On contemplation of the debtor's financial 
circumstances, a voluntary reduction in income after divorce should be considered, along 
with the motivations for such reduction. See In re Smither, 194 B.R. 102, 111 (Bankr. W.D. 
Ky. 1996) ("[W]e hold that where either a Debtor or Creditor has voluntarily reduced their 
income, that voluntary reduction should ... be considered by the Court in making the 
523(a)(15)(B) determinations."). For example, a debtor should not be allowed to 
unnecessarily take a lower-paying job or quit and then use that fact as part of his 
justification for discharge. 
233. Because the divorce agreement may assign various debts to both parties upon 
dissolution of the marriage, the court should heed the extent to which the nondebtor 
spouse is already burdened with marital debts that would inhibit her ability to assume 
additional debt. 
234. That the debtor agreed to pay any obligations that would othenvise be 
discharged must be weighed when the debtor later seeks to discharge obligations to his ex-
spouse. Hill is an example of a case where the debtor reaffirmed certain non-marital debts 
and was still able to discharge marital debt obligations. There, the debtor reaffirmed debts 
of $2325, a portion of which was used for a piece of band equipment. See Hill v. Hill (In re 
Hill), 184 B.R. 750, 755 (Bankr. N.D. Til. 1995). Furthermore, the relative importance of 
marital and other, reaffirmed debts should be compared. Given the important 
implications for discharge of marital debts, and Congress's concern for better protection 
of marital obligations, reaffirmed debts should be considered more important only in rare 
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are also important.235 Finally, the number of dependents of both debtor 
and nondebtor should be considered, along with any undesirable effects 
of discharge (or failure to discharge) on children. One factor that em-
phatically should not be considered, at least to the extent that such con-
sideration might weigh in favor of discnarge, is possible (as opposed to 
unavoidable or present) bankruptcy of the creditor ex-spouse. 236 To the 
contrary, "the implication that a non-debtor would need to file bank-
ruptcy because of another's debt militates in [her] favor because it is a 
detriment to [her] financial status and credit rating."237 
In balancing economic interests, courts should consider the parties' 
relative standards of living, as the court did in Smither.238 If the debtor's 
standard of living will be higher than or equal to the creditor's, the debt 
should not be discharged; if the debtor's standard of living falls materially 
below the creditor's, the debt-in most cases-should be discharged.239 
Courts should apply the most searching scrutiny to debtors' claims of in-
come insufficient or barely sufficient to sustain their standard ofliving.240 
A recently divorced creditor should not be forced to subsidize her ex-
spouse's upwardly mobile lifestyle through the assumption of debts that 
her ex-spouse 'vas assigned under the divorce settlement.241 This ap-
proach helps focus the nebulous "totality of the circumstances" test into 
manageable form by directing evaluation of economic factors towards as-
certaining the parties' standards of living. Consideration of a finite set of 
economic factors, cabined in terms of standard of living, helps minimize 
the somewhat rampant flexibility, lack of uniformity, and broad discre-
tion inherent in the language of the balancing test and its factors.242 
D. "Equality of Circumstances" 
The provisions above should suffice to guide courts in straightfor-
ward cases arising under section 523(a) (15) (B) where the parties stand in 
measurable economic disequilibrium. More difficult cases arise when the 
cases. Consider HiU: It is extremely alarming that band equipment should take 
precedence over the obligations that the debtor assumed upon dissolution of the marriage. 
See also Humiston v. Huddelston (In re Huddelston), 194 B.R. 681, 684 n.5 (Bankr. N.D. 
Ga. 1996) ("Notwithstanding his lack of any cognizable source of income, however, the 
Debtor has seen fit to reaffirm the debt on a bass boat as part of his bankruptcy case."). 
235. At the very least, courts must consider exempted property as an important aspect 
of the creditor's standard of living, especially when this exemption is substantial and not 
necessary for the support of the debtor and his dependents. 
236. See supra notes 166-172 and accompanying text. 
237. Schmitt v. Eubanks (In re Schmitt), 197 B.R. 312, 317 (Bankr. W.D. Ark. 1996). 
238. See supra Part II.C.3. 
239. See supra text accompanying note 186. 
240. Recall that a woman is more likely to be the creditor and to experience a 
dramatic reduction in standard of living after divorce, while a man's standard of living 
generally rises. See supra note 63 and accompanying text. 
241. Such a consideration may mitigate the extent to which women suffer 
disproportionate adverse affects in bankruptcy. See supra Part I.C.2. 
242. See supra notes 191-197 and accompanying text. 
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parties involved exhibit an "equality of circumstances"-an equal ability 
or inability to pay the debt, or approximately equal standards of living. 
Congress has stated that marital debts should not be discharged unless 
"discharging such debt would result in a benefit to the debtor that out-
weighs the detrimental consequences to a spouse, former spouse, or child 
of the debtor."243 When the parties have achieved an equality of circum-
stances, however, the proper presumption is that the benefit to the 
debtor will never outweigh the detriment to the creditor ex-spouse.244 
When the parties are similarly situated, the sides of the balance are 
equally weighted. Thus, when competing equities are neutralized by the 
parties' circumstances, courts should maintain the status quo and not 
tinker unnecessarily with the previous court-mandated results of divorce. 
The marital debts as ordered or sanctioned by family courts should re-
main unaltered. 
Important considerations of policy, judicial economy, and legislative 
intent necessitate this conclusion. The divorce court, or the parties them-
selves, divided the property and debts of the couple after reviewing their 
individual circumstances, as well as those of their marriage. Bankruptcy 
courts should respect, as a matter of comity, family court determinations 
and accept that there are substantial justifications for the division as or-
dered, which was specifically meant to equalize and compensate the rela-
tive positions of the parties. For example, the division may have been 
ordered to compensate one spouse for substantial work performed over 
the years in the home and ·with children, or in compensation for the sub-
ordination of personal and professional needs to those of family or 
spouse.245 
Such a rule would address congressional concerns that bankruptcy 
filing should not be used to avoid legitimate marital and child support 
obligations, 246 as well as lessening the tendency currently evinced by 
some courts to discharge such debts inappropriately. It also would serve 
to better safeguard the interests of those Congress intended to protect 
243. 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(15)(B) (1994). 
244. See, e.g., In re Smither, 194 B.R. 102, 112 (Bankr. W.D. Ky. 1996) ("As this court 
finds that the parties' standards of living are approximately equal, regardless of whether 
this debt is discharged, this Court holds that the Debtor has failed to show that the benefit 
of a discharge of this debt outweighs the detriment to the Creditor which would arise if the 
discharge is granted, and that the obligation is therefore dischargeable."); see also 
Anthony v. Anthony (In re Anthony), 190 B.R. 433, 439 (Bankr. N.D. Ala. 1995) 
(explaining that "the facts demonstrate that the scales, if not in Ms. Anthony's favor, are 
equally balanced"). But see Silvers v. Silvers (In re Silvers), 187 B.R. 648, 649 (Bankr. W.D. 
Mo. 1995) (debt discharged although parties had "equal inability to pay"); Woodworth v. 
Woodworth (In re Woodworth), 187 B.R. 174, 176 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1995) (debt 
discharged although neither party had funds to pay debt in question). 
245. See supra notes 45-47 and accompanying text. 
246. See H.R. Rep. No. 103-835, at 54 (1994), reprinted in 1994 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3340, 
3363-64. 
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and who often are hurt severely in bankruptcy proceedings-creditor ex-
spouses. 247 
E. Partial.Discharge 
When the debtor is unable to repay the entire debt at issue, the court 
should use its equitable powers to fashion a remedy of partial discharge. 
Though some believe that the statute does not contain language allowing 
partial discharge,248 others have argued that it seems unlikely that 
Congress would require an "all or nothing" approach to this issue without 
a "specific legislative directive. "249 One of the earliest reported cases ap-
plying section 523(a) (15) did allow partial discharge.250 In Comisky v. 
Comisky, the court analogized to the student loan context, and noted that 
courts found discretion to declare only part of a debt dischargeable, or 
found a debt nondischargeable while limiting the enforcement of the 
judgment. 251 Since courts must already use their equitable powers in de-
termining the discharge of marital debts,252 they should not hesitate to 
do so here. An "all or nothing" approach is particularly harsh when con-
sidered in context of the issues mentioned above, and in light of 
Congress's goal of better protecting the disadvantaged nondebtor 
spouse's interests. 
This approach, however, should be used with caution. Because par-
tial discharge involves a more sophisticated calculus than does absolute 
discharge or nondischarge (i.e., the husband now bears less than the en-
tire burden for a debt and the wife bears more), this type of determina-
tion may be more complicated than determining the dischargeability of a 
debt. Before sanctioning a complete discharge to the detriment of the 
creditor, however, courts should consider partial discharge as a more eq-
uitable middle ground. 
F. Deference to State Courts 
Finally, to the extent that bankruptcy courts must go beyond the eco-
nomic factors listed above in any given case, they should defer to state 
247. Those creditor ex-spouses are usually women. See supra Part I.C.2 It should be 
noted that women are not exclusively harmed in this context. For example, in Becker v. 
Becker (In re Becker), 185 B.R 567 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 1995), the husband was the creditor 
ex-spouse. The couple agreed during their marriage that he would care for children and 
manage property because she had the better education and earning potential. See id. at 
570. Statistics suggest that in discharge cases, however, men are much more often debtors 
and women creditors. See supra Part I.C.2. 
248. See supra note 207 (discussion of split of authority in this area). 
249. Bowles, supra note 57, at 3. 
250. See Comiskyv. Comisky (In re Comisky), 183 B.R 883 (Bankr. N.D. Cal. 1995). 
251. See id. at 884 (citing Gammoh v. Ohio Student Loan Comm'n (In re Gammoh), 
174 B.R 707 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1994); Sands v. United Student Aid Funds, Inc. (In re 
Sands), 166 B.R 299 (Bankr. W.D. Mich. 1994); Cadle Co. v. Webb (In re Webb), 132 B.R 
199 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1991)). 
252. See supra note 110 and accompanying text. 
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court findings of fact regarding parties' intent, motivations, and actions 
during and after marriage. Such deference would address concerns of 
commentators and judges about federal court involvement in this area, 253 
and would give precedence to the findings of courts that have expertise 
in this area and that actually hear testimony and concerns of the parties 
at the time of divorce. 254 State court divorce decrees are much more 
reliable sources of authority for noneconomic factors. Either through 
testimony and litigation, or through the incorporation of a separation 
agreement, divorce decrees are the end product of a process that pains-
takingly considers the relationship beuveen the t\V'o parties, both parties' 
interests, and their collective and individual desires.255 No relitigation of 
issues already tried in state court would be necessary. In essence, this 
deference would leave the consideration of such issues to the most appro-
priate and expert forum. 
CONCLUSION 
This Note has shown that although the new section 523(a) (15) (B) 
has improved protection for marital property settlement debts during 
bankruptcy, the broader remedial effect intended by Congress remains 
unrealized. Because Congress gave the bankruptcy bench little to work 
with in the way of legislative history and because there is no Bankruptcy 
Code provision with an analogous balancing test, bankruptcy judges have 
attempted to design their own standards with varying degrees of success 
and with a fair amount of frustration. This Note has proposed guidelines 
to help judges and practitioners navigate section 523 (a) (15) (B). The im-
plementation of the proposed guidelines would give bankruptcy judges 
greater direction in applying section 523(a) (15) (B), while better protect-
ing the interests of those most often harmed in such proceedings and 
limiting the role of federal courts in the domestic relations area. These 
proposals would better realize congressional intent and simplify the task 
of ban~ptcy judges. 
253. See supra notes 94-97 and accompanying text. 
254. See supra notes 92-93 and accompanying text. 
255. See supra notes 29-34 and accompanying text. 
